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ABSTRACT 
As traditional oil and gas deposits dwindle, non-traditional marginal reserves are being 
exploited to further economical and industrial needs worldwide. These reserves are often 
far from civilization, deep in the sea or in regions such as the Arctic. Now, more than 
ever, risks related to transporting oil and gas products need to be determined in these 
remote and sensitive ecological areas. Continuous monitoring of subsea pipelines is the 
best way to detect leaks quickly and prevent/minimize damage. A number of systems and 
technologies exist for this purpose. The present work describes two analytical approaches 
to making decisions related to best technology selection. The first is selecting the best 
available technology through researching desired parameters and conducting objective 
analysis. The second approach uses a risk-based methodology for identifying the best 
technology. The key focus of the present work is to develop a method to quantify 
uncertainties involved with leak detection technologies on subsea arctic pipelines 
applicable to harsh environments and use the quantified uncertainty in decision making. 
This thesis presents both approaches in detail and discusses their application to a real-life 
case study. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
As traditional oil and gas deposits dwindle, non-traditional marginal reserves are being exploited 
to further economical and industrial needs worldwide. These sites are often far from civilization, 
in regions such as the Arctic and the deep sea. Because of the remote and ecologically sensitive 
nature of these operational areas, risks need to be quantified as much as assets. Subsea Leak 
Detection (SLD) is important for protecting the environment and reducing the risks involved in 
subsea exploration and production. Small, chronic leaks are difficult to detect and can lead to 
substantial product loss over time. 
Leak detection technologies can be broadly divided into two classes: primary or computational-
based leak detection technology, and secondary or hardware-based leak detection technology. 
An alternative term for these two classes are: intrinsic LOSs (these are general in the flow of the 
product being monitored) and extrinsic (system located outside of the flow) as seen in Figure 1.1. 
While pnmary leak detection technology, Computational Process Monitoring (CPM) usmg 
standard mass flow or pressure balance, is effective, its capability in finding small chronic 
leakage is extremely limited, and secondary Leak Detection Systems (LDSs) have proven 
necessary. Monitoring subsea pipelines as often as possible is most effective for catching leaks 
quickly. A number of options exist to monitor pipelines continuously or intermittently. 
Intermittent checking of a pipeline can be done with remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), 
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automated underwater vehicles (AUVs), divers with attached sensors, or vapor sensors 
measuring hydrocarbons at fixed intervals. 
Continuous monitoring systems are located outside the pipe. These systems monitor areas around 
the pipeline for potential leaks. Such systems can include fiber optic cables that measure 
temperature, sound, and strain along their length; passive and active acoustic measuring of 
continuous or point sensors; capacitance-based sensors measuring the dielectric constant in a 
fluid medium; and vapor sensors that sense leaking hydrocarbons. 
Determining the location and size of such chronic leaks is important. Even with modern 
technological options, pipeline leak detection is an ongoing research area and the technology is 
still emerging. Certain characteristics make some LOSs better than others, for example, the 
ability to find the smallest leaks, to locate leaks immediately after detection, to continuously 
monitor an entire pipeline, and to operate in extreme arctic and deep subsea conditions. Certain 
areas of flow lines, such as connections and valves, are more susceptible than others to leaks, and 
these may require more focused LOSs as well. The detectability of a leak can depend upon the 
technology and the specific scenario. Therefore, it is important that a vigorous scientific method 
be developed that can combine information from multiple sources for proper decision making. 
Such technology evaluation requires complex decision making and objectivity in the analysis. 
The proposed risk-based method incorporates a comprehensive decision-making framework 
involving subjective and objective risk analysis to form comprehensive solutions. 
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The inputs to risk-based evaluation methodology are based on a literature review, vendor data 
sheets, and fitness for purpose assessments. Further, detailed evaluation criteria and weights are 
developed and included in the thesis. The evaluation criteria include smallest leak detection 
capability, ability to pinpoint exact leak location, false alarm rate, response time, information 
provided to respond to leak effectively, performance during transient operating conditions (start 
up, shutdown, and steady state), functionality without visibility (periods of ice cover), 
performance over long pipeline lengths, temperature and pressure constraints, performance (on 
seabed and/or buried), installability, rate or volume classification, lifespan of LOS, and multi-use 
capability. 
The following leak detection technologies are included in the evaluation: 
• Fiber optic cable (FOC) 
• Distributed temperature sensor (DTS) 
• Distributed strain sensor (DSS) 
• Active acoustic sensor 
• Passive acoustic sensor 
• Capacitance sensors 
• Vapor sensors 
• ROY -mounted optical cameras 
• Mechanical detectors 
3 
Risk-based Selection of Subsea Leak Detection Technologies Hillier, A. 
Extrinsic Intrinsic 
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Figure 1.1: C lassification of Subsea Pipeline Leak Detection Technologies 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of subsea leak detection technologies and 
technology evaluation methodologies. The working principles of leak detection technologies, 
specifically the extrinsic leak detection technologies and their advantages and disadvantages, are 
described in Sections 2.1 to 2.7. In Sections 2.8 and 2.9, various technology evaluation 
methodologies, namely Technology Readiness Levels, Best Practicable Environment Option, 
STEP Methodology with Paired Comparison Method, and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, are 
described, and their strengths and limitations are pointed out. Sections 2.1 0 and 2.11 discuss risk 
analysis in engineering. 
2.1. Review of Leak Detection Technologies 
Figure 1.1: Classification of Subsea Pipeline Leak Detection Technologies shows the 
classification of LDSs. LDSs are broken into two groups. Intrinsic or primary LDSs use 
measured flow data such as flow rate, pressure, viscosity, temperature, density, and other factors 
to detect potential leaks. Usually these instruments are an integral part of the pipeline transport 
system. The data acquired from these sensors is analyzed to determine the flow conditions and to 
detect leaks in a pipeline, and can also work in real time to predict leaks. It has the ability to 
detect large leaks quickly, but has limited ability to detect small, chronic leaks (below I% of 
flow). Operational procedures are also involved in the LDSs. Shut-in pressure tests and other 
tests are used to determine if there is a problem in the source or flow of product along the 
pipeline. 
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Extrinsic systems measure changes in physical properties around a pipeline or subsea 
installation. They can include continuous monitoring using distributed fiber optic cables that 
detect temperature, strain, and vibration; other intermittent point-sensing methods include 
cameras, capacitance/dielectric measuring methods, and hydrocarbon vapor sensors. Extrinsic 
systems are generally used external to the flow, outside the pipeline. 
This document evaluates existing LDSs that can be used effectively for rapidly detecting small 
leaks in subsea pipelines. Since intrinsic methods such as real-time transient monitoring 
(RTTM), mass balance (MB), pressure balance (PB), and others have limitations in detecting 
small chronic leaks quickly ([1] , [2]), the focus in this evaluation is on extrinsic LDSs that are 
laid on the seabed or buried in soil. LDSs for both continuous monitoring and intermittent testing 
are included in the study. 
2.2. Vapor-Sensing Systems (VSSs) 
These systems incorporate a semiconductor to detect hydrocarbon in oil and gas spills, and detect 
small leaks in the parts per billion. The principle of operation is that hydrocarbon wi ll change the 
resistance of an intrinsic component in the sensor chamber, which changes electrical signals in 
the system, alerting an operator. It is a physical form of LDS that does not depend on mass flow 
or pressure in the pipeline. The various alternative structures of the VSS are described in the 
following sections. 
6 
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2.2.1. Semi-Impermeable Tube 
This method involves a semi-impermeable tube placed along the length of a buried or on-seabed 
subsea pipeline route. The tube is permeable to air, oil, and gas molecules, but not to water (at 
shallow depths, as it can withstand hydrostatic pressure) or soil. The tube is vacuumed out and 
analyzed at regular intervals. If it contains hydrocarbons, an alarm is triggered. This system has 
been tested and used in (shallow water) subsea and onshore applications ([3] , [4]). 
2.2.2. ROY-Mounted 
Systems can be mounted on ROVs or placed as point sensors where oil and gas molecules can 
permeate membranes and be detected. Figure 2.1 is based on a semi-conductor detector. These 
types of system do not require a pump or flow around them, because they sample the seawater 
continuously. Likewise, if a point sensor is placed on an AUV, it will be able to sample along a 
route travelled [5]. 
Membrane 
suppot1 
Figure 2.1: ROY-Mounted Sensor (Redrawn froml41) 
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2.2.3. Pipe-in-Pipe Design 
A deep-sea pipe-in-pipe design is used to create an annulus between two pipes, which is pumped 
out daily. The vacuum between the two pipes is beneficial for arctic conditions because of its 
insulating properties. When a leak occurs in the product flow line, the gas or liquid spills into the 
outer annulus and is pumped using a vacuum pump to sensors that will detect any presence of 
hydrocarbon along the line. When hydrocarbon is detected, a signal is sent through the telemetry 
system, and then action can be taken. A schematic diagram of a pipe-in-pipe vacuum system is 
presented in Figure 2.2(6]. Using Figure 2.3 the delay between the time the vacuum is started 
and the time the sensor senses the hydrocarbon can be used to find the approximate location of 
the leak along the pipeline. 
2.2.4. Capabilities of Technology 
This technology has been installed successfully on arctic subsea systems ([3], [ 4]) and monitored 
using semi-impermeable tubes and the vacuum space between pipes. Gas solubility in the deep 
sea remains a concern if suction lines are used. 
2.2.4. 1. Advantages ofthe VSS ([7], [8] , [9] , (10]) 
• This system can detect small leaks which cannot be detected by traditional 
software and/or mass balance/real-time transient analysis methods that are used 
with intrinsic LOSs. It is sensitive to below 1% of flow rate. 
• Pipe-in-pipe systems further insulate the flowing product against the surrounding 
environment. 
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• A VSS can locate leaks within 20m (specifically, 50 m per 10 km in the case of 
Avera NP semi-impermeable tube) 
2.2.4.2. Limitations ofVSSs ([7], [8], [9], [I 0]) 
• The time required to detect leaks is based on pumping capacity and the time 
between pumping for pipe-in-pipe and tube systems. 
• The detection time is limited by the time between air circulations. 
• It is not a continuous operation. 
• The sensor must be in direct contact with hydrocarbon molecules for a leak to be 
detected 
• Vacuum annulus monitoring, used with pipe-in-pipe technology, is limited by 
distance and by the possibility of lifting and installing larger pipelines than 
normal. 
• Deep-sea pressures cause hydrocarbon based gases to dissolve, limiting the high-
concentration gas phases around detectors. 
• Membrane maintenance and drift of sensor readings are known issues. 
• The system depends on ocean currents moving released product to sensors (in the 
case ofROVs and permeable tubes). 
• It is not possible to quantify leak size accurately. 
• Semi-impermeable tubes are limited by depth to ~ 6 bar pressure (~30m) 
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Hydrocarbon sensor 
Time increasing from vacuum start 
Figure 2.2: Schematic diagram of a pipe-in-pipe vacuum system (Redrawn fromj61) 
2.3. Capacitance/Dielectric Sensors 
A capacitance/dielectric sensor is a point sensor that measures the dielectric constant of the fluid 
that comes in direct contact between capacitive plates. The dielectric permittivity (cr=Cx/C0) is a 
relation of the value measured using a test capacitor, where Cx is the dielectric constant between 
two capacitance plates at any time, for a specific material, and Co is the capacitance between the 
two plates in vacuum (a constant value). Because water and petroleum products have different Cx 
values, it is possible to use instruments to measure when the dielectric permittivity changes for a 
given scenario. For example, the difference between the dielectric permittivity of water (cr=- 80) 
and petroleum products (cr=2.5) is high. Therefore, when oil comes in contact with the sensor, 
hydrocarbons are easily detected because of the change in the dielectric constant measured by the 
sensor. 
10 
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2.3. 1. Permanently Installed with Shroud 
Permanently installed sensors with shrouds are small, have low power consumption, and are the 
most widely used subsea leak-detecting sensors of oil and gas. They usually require a collector 
hood around them to increase the amount of spilled product near the sensor. Direct contact is 
required for the sensor to detect hydrocarbons. This is an older technology, so it faces fewer 
unknowns in maintenance and performance. The literature shows [9] that gas is more easi ly 
detectable than oil at any depth of water, except depths in which the gas will dissolve. Liquid 
hydrocarbons in water have been known to coalesce in the collectors, causing some difficulty in 
detecting leaks [11]. Any natural hydrocarbon releases in the area of the collector hood around 
the sensor may be detected as false leak alarms. Capacitance sensors need to be placed with 
collectors above specific small areas (meters squared) and so have very limited use for pipelines. 
Vapor sensors, described above in Section 2.2.4, are similar in application and leak detectability 
rate. 
,------ Installed shroud 
------Subsea installation leak 
source 
Figure 2.3: Capacitance shroud over installation (redrawn from 1121) 
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2.3.2. Capabilities of Technology 
Capacitance sensors have been widely used in the North Sea for subsea monitoring of pipelines 
and templates. They are placed above points of leaks (pipe joints or production equipment), with 
steel shrouds that capture leaked material, for better chances of detection. Because of the limited 
range of collector shrouds, the potential for their use in arctic subsea conditions is poor. Greater 
pressure differences between product and environment increase detectability as a result of the 
upward movement of gas, whereas the opposite is true for liquid oil. Because of the ejection 
velocity of liquid from a pipeline, many tiny droplets spread in water. It was hypothesized that 
liquid oil droplets floating in seawater require time to collect together, form the liquid phase of 
oil, and trip the sensor [11]. Further research is required to determine the gas dissolvability and 
the effects of high subsea pressures on sensor readings. 
2.3.2.1. Advantages of Capacitance Sensors ([7], [8] , [9], [11]) 
• Very good detectability of subsea gas releases 
• Low power requirements 
• Used by industry in the North Sea since the 1990s 
• No calibration required 
2.3 .2.2. Limitations of Capacitance Sensors ([7] , [8] , [9] , [11]) 
• Physical contact is required between the sensor and petroleum products. 
• The only leaks detected are those in the collector shroud. 
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• Liquid releases are more difficult to sense because liquid does not coalesce as 
easily as gas in the housing around the sensor. 
• Deep-sea pressures cause hydrocarbon-based gases to dissolve, thus causing more 
difficult collection oftrapped oil molecules. 
• The amounts of fluid released cannot be known. 
• Errors are possible from coalescence product in the sensor collective area. 
• The system is not suitable for long pipelines. 
• The system is difficult to retrofit on existing structures because additional design 
is required. 
• False alarms can come from natural product releases from seabed. 
2.4. Fiber Optic Cable (FOC)-Based Sensors 
The basic concept of this system is the use of FOC and sensor technology, which can provide 
distributed temperature, strain, and vibration sensing that, when analyzed, gives information on 
changes along the length of the pipeline [13]. First, a light is pulsed down a FOC; as it reflects 
and returns, the reflected signal is analyzed. The FOC is generally strapped to or buried near a 
pipeline [8]. Disturbances can be caused by vibrations, seismic waves/acoustic signals, or 
temperature changes from the environment or from contained product in the pipeline being 
monitored [9]. These FOC methods have the potential to be used as both short point sensors or as 
distributed cable sensors along pipelines [5] . 
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The FOCs are based on Rayleigh Optical Time Domain Reflectometry (OTDR). It is a well-
established method for the characterization of distributions of parameters in optical fibers and is 
also used heavily in the optical telecommunications industry for quality control (attenuation and 
linearity) after manufacturing, and after splicing cables for installations. Incident pulses of light 
(usually 10 ns to 100 ns) are fired down the fibers to be characterized. When the light is 
propagating down the fibers, some of it is scattered because of inconsistencies in the glass. As 
the light travels down a length of fiber, some of it is reflected back to the source. This happens 
continuously, and so the return signal can be analyzed (based on time and distance travelled) and 
compared to the original emitted light signal. The attenuation in the fiber, the length of the fiber, 
and any defects or non-linearities can be determined at specific points along the fiber [14]. The 
FOC-based sensors are broadly classified as distributed temperature sensors (DTSs), distributed 
strain sensors (DSSs), and distributed vibration (or acoustics) sensors (DVSs or DASs). 
The DTS measurement provides information on the distribution of temperature along a sensing 
optical cable. Some situations involving temperature change include: highly compressed (or 
liquefied) gas in a pipeline expanding because of the Joule-Thompson effect, high-temperature 
oil spilling into a cooler environment, and spills wam1ing up the pipeline surroundings near 
sensors. The DSS provides strain measurement (for detection of pipe strain or ground movement) 
based on Brillouin scattering of light waves sent in the optical fibers. Temperature increases the 
anti-Stokes component of the Raman band, while strain does not (Figure 2.4). The DVS provides 
information on acoustic events, such as those caused by third-party intervention (on onshore 
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pipelines), vortex-induced vibration and anchor impact (for offshore pipelines), or armor wire 
breakage in flexible risers [ 15]. 
Incident light 
Brillouin lines 
"Anti-stokes" Raman band "Stokes" Raman band 
0.1 nm 
lOOnm 
Figure 2.4: FOC Wave Spectrum (Redrawn from 1131) 
2.4.1. Distributed Temperature Sensing (DTS) 
Distributed Temperature Sensing (DTS) uses an external fiber optic cable strapped to a pipeline 
to monitor temperature along the length of the fiber. The DTS operates on a variant of the 
standard OTDR described above, where, along with the Rayleigh band reflected from incident 
light, another, smaller Raman band wavelength is reflected based on individual molecules in the 
fiber which vibrate due to thermal excitation (reception based on intensity of light received). The 
Raman-scattered light is due to the thermally-induced molecular vibrations. The Stokes and anti-
Stokes portions along the wavelength of light below describe the two relative wavelength sizes 
for the Raman band temperature sensing. The longer wavelength is attributed to the Stokes line 
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but is only weakly temperature-dependent. The intensity of the backscattered light at the shorter 
anti-Stokes wavelength increases strongly with temperature; thus, the backscatter of both Raman 
bands can be used to determine temperature information along an FOC strand. Raman-based 
systems are limited to approximately 10 km between each new laser/receptor system (12]. 
For subsea applications, the product leaks must cause changes in the temperature of the 
surrounding environment in order for a spill to be detected. Erosion conditions can also be 
predicted by DTS in the case of a buried pipeline in soil. Over time, the product will heat the 
insulating soil, and a temperature will be distributed along a pipeline. If the seabed is eroded, the 
area of the buried FOC will also detect the change, and mitigation can be pursued if necessary. It 
is possible that other environmental changes can offset the temperature as well, but in general, 
any unjustified and detected change in the temperature of the environment can indicate the 
release of hydrocarbons. 
The temperature change can vary, depending on the product. When liquid single-phase oil 
pipelines release product, they tend to heat up the surrounding environment, as they are usually 
heated above ambient temperature to reduce viscosity. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) or gas 
pipelines tend to cool the environment because of the Joule-Thomson gas expansion effect. 
2.4.2. Distributed Strain Sensing (DSS) 
DSS is based on Brillouin OTDR and relies on the detection of Brillouin scattered waves, which 
arise from the interaction between the incident photons and thermally-generated lattice vibrations 
in the optical fiber. The Brillouin OTDR operates in much the same way as Rayleigh OTDR, but 
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measures the spatial distribution of wavelength shifts and/or frequency of the Brillouin 
scattering, which gives information on strain and temperature conditions in the sensing fiber. 
This technique uses frequency measurement and is generally more accurate and stable over the 
long term than Raman, because Raman intensity can suffer from a higher sensitivity to drifts. 
Brillouin-based sensing techniques are generally faster at detecting environmental changes 
because of a higher signal-to-noise ratio than Raman, and they can be used over several tens of 
kilometers until a new extending relay system is required [16]. 
2.4.3. Distributed Vibration/Acoustic Sensing 
Distributed Vibration Sensing is similar to the standard Rayleigh OTDR, operating on the same 
backscatter principle, but using a different principle in sending the light signal and receiving it. 
The end result is that the system becomes highly sensitive to external influences in the 
environment (such as anchor drops or vibrations due to leaks). Sound waves (noises) are 
detectable, which allows for detection of small leaks. 
2.4.4. Capabilities ofTechnology 
Fiber optic cables and their low propagation-loss characteristics make them good detectors for 
physical parameter changes along a pipeline over long distances (up to several tens of 
kilometers). When a leak occurs, researchers have found that after a local temperature change is 
detected, an increase of 3 °K/min was observed [ 16]. Then the temperature starts to spread 
laterally at a speed of 0.5 m/min. The study found that it was possible to detect 50 ml/min of oil 
released and as low as 10 mllmin for chemicals [15] , and the precision was within 1 m resolution 
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of the fiber optic cable. The technology can also achieve accuracies below 1 °K, provided that the 
average time between sending and receiving laser signals is correctly set. 
2.4.4.1 . Advantages of FOC-Based Technology ([5] , [9], [12], [16]) 
• FOC-based systems can detect small leaks which may not be detected by 
traditional software and mass balance/real time transient analysis methods. 
• Simultaneous disturbances may be detected and positioned to approximately one-
meter accuracy along the FOC placed along a pipeline. 
• No power or electronics are required along the length of the cable and it IS 
immune to electrical interference. 
• The quantification of spills is possible as a result of a large change in temperature, 
sound waves, or other parameters over a length of the pipeline. 
• Installation, inspection, and maintenance are straightforward. 
2.4.4.2. Limitations ofFOC Technology ([5], [9], [12], [16]) 
• Project experience with this technology offshore is limited. 
• Temperature, strain, leak-induced noise, or other physical change must be near 
enough for the sensor to register it properly and provide a timely alarm. 
• This technology is detection-sensitive and time dependent on plume migration for 
detection. Further study is necessary to understand this. 
2.5. Acoustic Sensors 
Acoustic sensors are classified as passive acoustic sensors or active acoustic sensors. 
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2.5.1. Passive Acoustic Sensors 
Passive sensors are underwater microphones or hydrophones; they use sound or pressure waves 
in water to detect leaks. The passive acoustic detection principle consists of listening 
hydrophones that detect any surrounding acoustic emissions (Figure 2.5). Valves, machines, and 
other mechanical equipment and high pressure leaks can be recorded [ 11]. Because of the 
excellent acoustic propagation properties of water, this technology is even better suited for 
subsea monitoring conditions. Using multiple sources to detect changes in subsea acoustics, 
along with modem signal processing techniques, will provide distance and direction to any 
acoustic changes in the environment. This will allow the system to detect and locate leaks in a 
3D environment. From the intensity of the sound waves, it may also be possible to estimate leak 
location and size (i.e., smal l or large). 
AITay axis 
Acoustic receivers 
Figure 2.5: Signal separation and noise cancelling (Redrawn fromll7J) 
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Usually, subsea leakages from high-pressure sources generate significant noise and this results in 
their detection. It is also possible to filter out known sounds such as general production noise and 
natural seepage, so that leaks can be detected and trended despite background noise. If three or 
more hydrophones are used together, the leakages can be localized by noise triangulation based 
on the speed of sound in water to determine the distance from each hydrophone. 
The sensor array on the Ormen Lange template [17] (which is 1 m in diameter and 1.7 m in 
height) has high-frequency (HF) and medium/low-frequency sensors (M/LF). The M/LF extends 
to the 20 kHz range and is primarily used for monitoring structural vibrations and conditions of 
mechanical systems. Leaks are handled by the HF sensors. The first step of the system (Figure 
2.5) is the special sound separation and noise cancellation in the environment. The second step 
involves analysis of the recorded data; finally, diagnostics of the system are performed. Sound 
waves in water can also cause shadow waves a short distance behind an object in the water, and 
then it is only after a certain distance that the waves show up again behind the object. At a 500-
meter water depth, Ormen Lange's passive sensors were able to detect gas leaks of 25 standard 
liters/minute at a change in pressure of 5 bar at a distance of 25 meters. Oil leaks were tested by 
SINTEF in a basin in Trondheim and detected at 5 Llmin, 5 bar pressure change, and a distance 
of 5 meters. In general, literature has claimed that passive point sensors can cover areas from 100 
to 200 feet, and generally this is their spacing along pipelines [1 0]. 
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Surrounding 
seawater at 
P2 
Pipeline 
Pressure differential across leak 
Figure 2.6: Leakage Noise is generated from leak (Redrawn from 1171) 
Another type of passive sensor measures high-frequency sound waves while being attached to a 
pipeline. The principle is that the high difference in pressure between the escaping fluids will 
cause vibrations in the pipe which differ from those sensed in normal operating conditions. 
Detectability [18] for gas: change in pressure > 1 bar with minimum leakage rate 0.1 1/min. 
Liquid detectability for gas: change in pressure > 3 bar, minimum leakage rate 0.1 !/min. The 
effective distance of this product is unknown (Figure 2. 7). 
2.5.2. Capabilities of Technology 
2.5.2.1. Advantages of Passive Acoustic Sensors ([5], [9] , [11], [17]) 
• Less affected by turbidity and sea currents (as opposed to other point sensors). 
• Can be used on reverse leaks that may happen in deep water with no external 
leaks. Can also be used for spatial coverage. 
• Positioning is possible using more than two sensors for spatial coverage. 
• Acoustic sounds can be detected from nearer than a meter to ~ 1 00 m. 
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2.5.2.2. Limitations of Passive Acoustic Sensors ([5], [9], [11], [17]) 
• Commercial experience in subsea leak detection is relatively low. 
• The sound from a small leak may not reach the hydrophone and therefore may go 
undetected. 
• A sufficient pressure drop over the leak path is a requirement for detection 
(having sufficient pressure gradient between the pipeline and the surroundings). 
2.5.3. Active Acoustic Sensors 
Active acoustic sensors are employed in inspections for a leak. Usually, the sensor is mounted on 
an ROY's AUV or towed system and hence it is not a continuous monitoring technique. It works 
as a point sensor and operates on similar principles of Radio Detection And Ranging (RADAR). 
Active sensors rely on sending out sound pulses that reflect off the surroundings and return to a 
hydrophone. The sound travels through a medium and is reflected back with varying intensity 
related to the objects or media it encounters. The information about reflected waves travelling 
between different media (boundaries of different impedance) is collected. From this data the leak 
can be inferred, since the signal changes as the medium changes, because of different densities 
(and other properties). Other products in this category use 3D acoustic scanning to map entire 
pipelines. 
2.5.4. Capabilities of Technology 
Acoustic sensors are simple, robust, low-cost systems and have high potential for detection of 
leaks generating noise [5]. These sensors contain hydrophones (underwater microphones) 
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picking up the pressure wave, or sound, generated by a rupture or leak and transmitted through a 
structure or water [9]. 
Based on [ 11], the results of testing showed that higher-pressure waves generated by leaks were 
easier to detect than those with less pressure differential than their surroundings. Increasing the 
distance of the leak to the detector source also lowered the chances of detection. It was 
determined that crude oil leakages were more difficult to detect than gas leakages (because of 
varying medium densities). A benefit of active acoustic technologies is that the technology has 
been used for decades in different fields ; the technology just has to be adapted to catching subsea 
leaks. 
2.5.4.1. Advantages of Active Acoustic Sensors([5] , [9], [11], [17] , [18]) 
• Provides area coverage so leak positioning is possible. 
• High sensitivity available for gas leak detection. 
• Advantageous for small leaks or where leaking pressure drop is not sufficient to 
generate noise. 
• High-definition sonar can be placed or mounted on ROY s. 
• Able to scan environments with acoustic high definition sonar to obtain a 30 
image of the pipeline (resolution depends on background noise). 
2.5.4.2. Limitations of Active Acoustic Sensor ([5], [9], [11] , [17]) 
• Sensitive to shadowing of acoustic signals created by subsea structures. 
• Typically used on ROVs, solutions for permanent monitoring under development. 
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2.6. Optical Methods 
Several types of cameras can be used to detect leaks, including cameras that induce ultraviolet-
fluorescence excitation with their own light source, regular direct visual cameras, laser smart 
Pipeline Inspection Gauges (PIGs) [19] , and others. This technology is a point/area sensor and 
acts as a passive recorder. Technologies that induce fluorescence excitation require an ultraviolet 
light source, and a camera to record the findings. These systems can include a laser, LED, or 
light bulb. When the fluorescent material present in the oil is excited during a leak, it emits a 
different wavelength of light from the original. When the different light is emitted, it is visible on 
a camera and the operators are alerted on the leak [20]. These are usually used as point sensors, 
or mounted on ROVs, AUVs, or towed systems to patrol pipelines for leaks. 
Though liquid hydrocarbons, and specifically crude oil, have a natural level of fluorescence, dyes 
are usually added to aid in visually identifying subsea leaks. 
2.6.1. Capabilities of Technology 
2.6.1.1. Advantages of Optical Methods ([9] , [4], [11], [20]) 
• Can detect small leaks which may not be identified by traditional software and 
mass balance/real time transient analysis methods. 
• Simultaneous disturbances may be detected and positioned to approximately one-
meter accuracy along the fiber placed along a pipeline. 
• No power or electronics are required along the length of the cable and it is 
immune to electrical interference. 
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2.6.1.2. Limitations of Optical Methods ([9], [4] , [11], [20]) 
• Being a point sensor, it is not good for continuous monitoring. 
• In arctic applications, ice cover may limit visibility. 
• Limited distance due to sediment and substances in water may let some leaks go 
undetected. 
• Marine growth on cameras requires cleaning. 
• Detectability is limited without introducing dyes into system. 
2.7. Mechanical Devices and Capabilities of Technology 
Recently, a number of mechanical devices have been deployed for subsea leak detection. One 
example is a gas collection tray over a hydrocarbon subsea installation. When gas rises because 
of a density differential in seawater, the force raises a metal cover. When the cover is raised, an 
alarm is triggered. 
2.7.1.1. Advantages of Mechanical Technology [5] 
• This system can detect small leaks which may not be detected by traditional 
software and/or mass balance/real time transient analysis methods 
• Acts on the simple principle of buoyancy (hydrocarbons are less dense then 
seawater) where the hydrocarbons get trapped while migrating to the surface 
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2.7.1.2. Limitations of Mechanical Technology: 
• Relatively new concept for extrinsic subsea pipeline use 
• Not continuous, coverage is limited 
2.8. Review of Technology Evaluation Methodologies 
2.8.1. Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 
TRLs are a systematic measurement system that supports assessmg the maturities of 
technologies. This approach has been used by the North American Space Agency (NASA) for 
many years and has been incorporated into NASA Management Instruction (NMI 7100). It is 
also used by the Department of Defense in the United States of America. It has nine levels. 
TRL 1: Basic principles are observed and reported. This is the lowest level of the scale, with the 
least technological maturity. At this level, scientific research starts being translated into applied 
research and development. An example can include studying silicon (S i) as a monolayer on a 
substance. The cost to achieve this level is very low. 
TRL 2: The technology concept and/or application have been formulated. At this level, after 
basic physical principles are observed, the next level of maturation and practical research begins. 
Following the previous example above on Si monolayers, this level would further the research to 
possible uses of such monolayers. Research may conclude that such monolayers could be used 
for sensors or other uses. The cost to achieve this is still very low. 
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TRL 3: Analysis begins of critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept. At this step in 
the maturation process, active research and development are initiated. This step includes 
analytical and laboratory-based studies. These validate "proof-of-concepts" from TRL 2. An 
example that follows the previous one would be to plate Si on a metal to ensure it can be used as 
a sensor. 
TRL 4: Components are validated in laboratory environment. Following the success of TRL 3, 
this level may establish how the pieces will work together to achieve concept-enabling 
performance levels. Continuing from TRL 3, an example may be testing the properties of Si 
films on gold substrates to foreign molecules in the laboratory. 
TRL 5: A component and/or breadboard validation is conducted in a relevant environment. This 
is a more advanced and in-depth analysis than the previous level, but sti ll a low-level 
achievement. 
TRL 6: The system model/prototype is tested in a relevant environment to demonstrate readiness. 
Examples include testing in a simulated operational environment. 
TRL 7: The system prototype is demonstrated in an operational environment. This achievement 
occurs when a complete prototype is demonstrated in an actual operational environment. 
Examples include an aircraft or vehicle in an operational environment. 
TRL 8: The actual system is completed and qualified through test and demonstration. The 
technology has been proven at this stage in its final form. In general, this level of TRL is the end 
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of system development. Examples include developmental tests and evaluation of vehicles or 
aircraft. 
TRL 9: The actual system is operated under successful mission operations. 
Pros: A simple 1-9 level approach to describing technology levels. 
Cons: Not useful for risk analysis, unless it is used to judge technologies or criteria, and then 
AHP or another analysis is carried out. 
2.8.2. Best Practicable Environment Option (BPEO) 
BPEO consists of 6 basic tasks ([21]) 
1. Define the objective 
2. Generate options for meeting the objective 
3 Assess the options 
4 Summarize the assessment 
5 Identify the BPEO 
6. Review the process 
This process is similar to other risk assessments for larger projects. The assessment criteria 
involve environmental impact, environmental risk, health and safety, and others. To evaluate 
criteria, simple tables are used, some of which include ranges of values from -5 to 5. For 
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example, -5 designates a possible catastrophe, -1 a moderate consequence that may possibly 
occur. In the evaluation of environmental factors, -5 represents over $10 million m 
environmental damage while +5 represents $1 0 million in revenue generated as a result of 
permanent improvements to the ecosystem. Other criteria are assessed with the same 
methodology. In the end, the numbers are added together for each scenario that is to be assessed, 
and the best options will have the highest score. 
This method of assessment is relatively simple, and it is related to other risk-assessment methods 
that involve number scales. The addition of all numbers can give a general idea of the risk to the 
environment. 
The cons of this type of assessment are the limiting analysis, which involves only the 
environmental assessment, and the use of constricted tables for analysis. The scale of the analysis 
may also be a problem when there are extreme values, for example, one criteria with a possible 
$5 million of damage, and another with $5 (is it fair to say one is -5, and other 0 in the overall 
analysis?). Though the method is quantitative, it relies on the decisions of evaluators for the 
specific scenario to determine what number to use, and this will add subjectivity. There is also 
considerable subjective and qualitative analysis involved in generating a conclusion involving a 
specific number of +1-x. 
2.8.3 . STEP Methodology with Paired Comparison Method 
The STEP methodology was developed as a means for engineers to evaluate technologies [22]. It 
consists of four steps and generally has the evaluators working with providers of new products to 
29 
Risk-based Selection of Subsea Leak Detection Technologies Hillier, A. 
find out which is the best technology. This methodology can also work in other fields and is 
discussed here in the context of decision making for subsea leak detection technologies. 
1. Scoping and Test Strategy: Evaluation teams study the objectives and technology background. 
The objectives and scope are described, and a survey is made to identify potential technologies. 
Drafting test methods are also developed. 
2. Test Preparation: The products and required infrastructure for testing are acquired. The 
evaluators and suppliers may meet to discuss the intended use. Specific criteria for testing and 
the test plan are further developed. 
3. Testing, Results, and Final Report: In this phase, the evaluation team tests and scores the 
technologies for their intended uses. Meetings are held with suppliers to discuss any problems or 
findings, and a final report is created. 
4. Integration and Deployment: Based on the final report, the evaluators consider which product 
is best to use. 
In the STEP evaluation and scoring workflow, each criterion of a technology is scored and 
assigned a weight for importance. 
The STEP method also recommended a paired comparison method for evaluating technologies 
with 10- 100 criteria. This method sorts desired criteria from most to least important. Then, each 
is assigned a letter. Comparisons involving >, =, and < are used to make equations (i.e. , a<b+c 
and a=b+d, while a is the most important and b, c, and dare less). When the process is completed 
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and the variables are solved for numbers, the total is summed; if a=10, b=S , c=l , and d=O then 
the total would be 16. Each criterion is then divided by the summed value to normalize it, and 
then each value is used as a weight. A, b, and c could then be .5 , .4, and .1 respectively. 
The STEP method is widely applicable; however, it uses subjective weights and criteria to judge 
technologies, and this may influence the final outcome. The paired comparison method is also 
subjective. 
2.8.4. Multi-step method 
A seven-step method was described by [23]. It is similar to other methods involving criteria and 
scoring to determine which is the best technology. The steps are briefly detailed below. 
I. Establish a team to do a preliminary assessment. This goal identifies all factors for the new 
technology. The team should implement a pre-evaluation of the technology proposal using 
quantitative objective factors, or subjective factors if objective are unobtainable, and use 
estimates in later steps for comparison. 
2. Select or reject the proposed technology (to continue evaluation) on the basis of the 
preliminary assessment. 
3. Identify where information is required from technical experts and consultants. The Delphi 
method (sending questionnaires and surveys to experts and knowledgeable companies for 
feedback) is recommended. 
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4. Compare new information arising from step 3 with that used in step 1. The Venn diagram is 
useful in comparing results recorded in step 1. 
5. Assess conflicts comparing information in step 1 and 4. 
6. Decide to terminate or proceed, repeating steps 3-5. The Delphi method IS agam 
recommended. 
7. Conduct a detailed evaluation, considering corporate objectives, strategy, marketing, financial 
criteria, and production criteria. 
The method is comprehensive and easy to follow. The authors included appendices with 
examples that explain the methodology clearly. However, the method has some cumbersome, 
repetitive steps. For example, in step 1, pre-evaluation and estimates are made; then, in step 2, 
selection or rejection of the technology is based on preliminary assessments. In step 4, the 
authors recommend comparing step 3 with step 1, but it may be better to do all of this in one 
step. In step 6, the decision to terminate or proceed involves repeating previous steps. Step 7 
calls for a further evaluation, which may have been better completed earlier. 
2.8.5. Multi-Criterion Decision-Making (MCDM) Methodology 
Technology evaluations started in the 1950s, when large-scale applications of technology began 
to affect people's lives [23] . Often, organizations use some form of decision making 
(technological or otherwise) for different tasks. Most technological evaluations involve 
information gathering on technologies, and then using some method to compare the desired 
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technology to a requirement. Assessments that can be performed include benefits analyses, 
riskfuncertainty analyses, simulations, and others. 
Multi-criterion decision making (MCDM) deals with choosing the best alternative from a series 
of possibilities. Decision makers always try to choose the best alternative; however, optimal 
solutions are only achievable in the case of singular and linear subjects. In most situations, 
priorities are needed for multi-parameter problems, and this is where the field of MCDM comes 
in. MCDM models are used to help people make educated decisions. A decision from one set of 
researchers may be different from another, even the same method is used, since different needs 
require different prioritizing. The purpose of MCDM is to allow decision makers to feel 
comfortable and confident about decisions. 
MCDM methods have two main components [24, 25]: 
1. Preferences in terms of each individual criterion. Specifically, these are models that describe 
overall performance levels based on individual criteria. The best choice conditions are when 
individual criteria are used to judge the overall system. 
2. An aggregation model (this is more commonly used), in one which allows inter-criteria 
comparisons that combine preferences across different criteria. Some criteria oppose others, and 
scoring each criterion may affect the overall results. This model uses a collective effort to 
achieve the best system performance based on multiple ranked parameters. The system is not 
chosen based on individual criteria, but with a multitude of alternatives together. 
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2.9. Examples of MCDM methods 
2.9.1. Pareto Optimality 
The basics of the Pareto Optimality (PO) [25, 26] method involve comparing different criteria 
and finding the best method. If there are two choices, a and b, and if one is better than the other, 
it is termed dominating. A single point P (Figure 2. 7) corresponds to one setting of two criteria. 
If each P has an equal scoring between two criteria, they are called PO points and are desirable. 
A PO point by definition is the best possible combination of the two criteria in Figure 2.7. If 
more Ps are added for different scenarios of the two criteria, then they will be compared; if a P is 
better in all four quadrants than another P, then the point will be a PO point. If P is better in some 
quadrant locations and not others, it will be either dominating or inferior. 
A simplified general illustration is below for a system with two criteria. There are four quadrant 
areas around the P point. If we focus on Pas the solution to two criteria, the area designated 1 is 
an inferior point for both criteria. Points 2 and 3 have one criterion maximized but the other less 
than the P point. Quadrant 4 is the best location, as it is better than the P point. Thus, any P 
placed in the 4th quadrant would be a PO point. In other words, new situations/criteria are 
considered and compared to others, and the best combined scenarios, having the most benefits 
for each criteria, are PO points. Also, each individual criterion will be given the maximum value 
possible, without subtracting from the other criteria in analysis to reach the maximum possible 
point in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7: PO example with four quadrants and PO point in center. 
If the system has more than 2 points, they can be projected onto a two-dimensional plane through 
further analysis. If a matrix or another means is used, the PO points can be projected and the 
solutions illustrated graphically as in Figure 2.7. 
One major criticism of this approach is that the methodology sometimes requires one criterion to 
be reduced so that another may increase. For example, in order to test leak detection 
technologies, with $1000 to spend on a technology, how is it determined what is fair and 
beneficial to spend on two criteria? Two researchers working on the same problem could assume 
800/200 for criteria alb while another researcher may make the opposite choice. Another 
disadvantage is that if risk-based analysis is used and monetary value is the deciding factor, then 
there is no need to use such analysis. It is a cumbersome way to analyze criteria within an 
industrial setting and can be done effectively only by very knowledgeable engineers. 
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2.9.2. Simple Additive Ranking 
This method is an intuitive approach to MCDM based on the ranking of criteria relative to each 
other, with individual scores using weights for importance [27]. A simple approach would be to 
assign a score to each criteria, and a weight for each criteria. A weighted average of the scores is 
used as an overall indicator to select appropriate technology. This gives a simple approach to 
MCDM, and the scores magnify the differences between criteria. 
The benefit ofthis approach is that it provides a robust, quick, and j ustified choice for those who 
have an educated background in the criteria. 
The cons of this method are that results can be skewed towards only technologies with the most 
weighted criteria, since weights are highly subjective. Scores are also subjective if they are used 
on a ranking scale (for example, 1-10), so decision makers must take care not to have entirely 
subjective results due to the bias different researchers will have in choosing numbers for the 
same criteria on the ranked scale. 
2.9.3. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
AHP is a general theory of measurement developed by T. L. Saaty. It is used to rank discrete and 
continuous criteria and make paired comparisons [28]. The comparisons can be based on 
objective or subjective data. AHP has been used widely in MCDM analysis. 
When AHP is used to model a problem, a hierarchic or network structure is created to represent 
the problem and to establish relations within the criteria. A scale is used to rank each criterion in 
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relation to another, based on importance. This process is based on scoring of 1-9 and is described 
in Table 2.1. 
The relations lead to dominance matrices, which are used to form the ratio scales between 
selected criteria being evaluated. After the selected criteria are ranked and compared to one 
another, matrices containing the weights are established. The end result provides a percent value 
for each alternative technology. 
Table 2.1:AHP scale example (redrawn from 1281) 
Importance Definition 
on absolute 
Explanation 
scale 
3 
5 
7 
"9 
Note : 2,4,6,8 
a re used to 
ba lance 
between 2 
judgments. 
Equal importance Two crite ria contribute 
equally to the decision 
Moderate Experience and judgment 
imporatance over strongly favor one activity 
each other over another 
Strong importance Experience and judgment 
strongly favor one activity 
over another 
Very strong 
importance 
Extreme 
importance 
An activity is strongly 
favored and its 
dominance demonstra ted 
in practice 
The evidence favoring 
one activity over another 
is paramount. 
These a re used when 
compromise in score is 
needed. 
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Pros: AHP is comprehensive and used in industry. 
Cons: AHP can be a relatively long process when historical objective data is available. Also, 
when compared to a simple weighted average method with scored criteria and engineering 
knowledge on the subject, AHP may not be more robust, and it is much more time-consuming 
for large problems. 
2. 1 0. Introduction to Risk Analysis 
This section deals with understanding risk analysis and issues related to the quantification of 
uncertainty. The next sections will describe the general methodology of risk assessment while 
outlining how it is used in the present analysis. 
2. 1 0.1. What is Risk Analysis 
Risk is simply the probability that an event or circumstance will occur, while at the same time, 
have some negative consequence on humans and the environment. Risk analysis is a systematic 
process used to identify and assess factors that may jeopardize the success of an event, situation, 
or scenario. Risk analysis also identifies or quantifies problematic events that are not easily 
determinable, and it can be used to compare different scenarios to obtain information about the 
effect of uncertain parameters on an outcome [29]. It generally has a positive effect on decision 
making and examines the impact that variables (and even their interaction with each other) have 
on a final outcome. Still, the use of risk-analysis tools remains limited, mostly because 
application details for specific scenarios are not straightforward [30]. 
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Risk analysis can be applied to almost any field of study where uncertainty exists. It can have 
substantial affects on personnel and even corporate/government policies. It is used in engineering 
analysis (reliability analysis and maintenance, drilling analysis, environmental analysis, etc.) 
[31], finance (investment risks, retirement planning, etc.), operations management (project 
management, etc.), and environmental sciences (landslides, avalanches, earthquakes, etc.) [32]. 
2.10.2. Risk Analysis and Systems Engineering 
Risk analysis is a comprehensive analytical technique that takes into account all aspects of a 
technology. Systems engineering is distinguished by its practice philosophy, which advocates a 
holistic approach in thought and decision-making. The engineering is based on modeling 
methodologies and procedures for the purpose of (1) creating an understanding of the system's 
nature and its interaction with surroundings, (2) improving the decision-making process, and (3) 
identifying and quantifying risks and uncertainties within the decision-making process [33]. 
These properties of systems engineering make risk-based analytical techniques a natural fit for 
risk-based analysis. 
2.1 0.3. Risk Calculation 
Risk is based on two things: the probability that an event (usually negative) will occur, based on 
data, and the consequences when the event occurs. The product of these two events yields the 
risk present in a scenario. 
Risk Probability o[Failure X consequence 
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2.11. Applications of Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is widely accepted and used in the oil and gas industry [31]. It is a powerful tool 
for certain engineering processes where decisions are required, and it has been used for oil well 
operations, underbalanced drilling projects [34], and reservoir and completion uncertainties [35]. 
Other applications also related to oil and gas are hazard analysis of cargo tank explosions on 
FPSOs (Floating Production, Storage and Offloading), blowout prevention [36] , and others. 
Risk analysis includes system description, hazard identification, scenano or incident 
identification, calculation of risk for each category, and consequence analysis. After these steps 
are complete, an analysis is made of the results, and recommendations can be made [33] . Risk 
assessments are important in several ways; a primary benefit is that the list of hazards and 
problem areas for design can be identified from the analysis. Issues that come up from first 
designs can lead to design changes or result in new approaches. They provide comprehensive 
information about problem areas and limiting factors in projects. Thus, they are key tools for 
engineers and project managers. 
Some problem identification techniques in risk analysis involve Hazard and Operability Studies 
(HAZOP) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). HAZOP involves using Process and 
Instrument Diagrams (PIDs) or reviewing other systems to determine proper operation 
procedures and system designs [37]. FMEA was generally limited to single failures in a 
component or subsystem and can be used with fault trees to determine problem areas. These 
tools are generally used as a first step in quantitative risk analysis [37]. Another tool is Risk-
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Based Integrity Modeling (RBIM), which finds an optimal strategy for inspection and 
maintenance. RBIM enables the assessment of a component's Probability of Failure (PoF) and 
the consequences of that failure, and identifies critical components for safe operation. 
2.11.1. Risk-Based Technology Evaluation of Liquefied Natural Gas Processes 
Risk-based technology evaluation methods have been applied to Gas To Liquids (GTL) and 
floating Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) processes and projects [38]. These new technologies have 
high industrial and economic uncertainties. Thus, a four-step methodology was developed to 
evaluate uncertainties. 
1. Technologies are shortlisted and general associated uncertainties/risks are determined. Two 
main criteria are used for evaluation in this section: technological availability and degree of 
development to date. Weighting factors are used to prioritize uncertainties/risks. Questionnaires 
are also sent to companies to aid analysis; detailed information reviews are completed, and face-
to-face meetings are performed to reduce uncertainties. The most developed and least risky 
technologies are selected for further review in the next steps. 
2. More specific uncertainties/risks are identified. Some issues result from known technical risks 
of the technologies, and others come from a lack of information about the technologies. Again, 
questionnaires are sent to industry participants to reduce the uncertainties. 
3. Uncertainties from stage 2 are further reduced. Further questionnaires are employed to obtain 
information from studies performed in the past, from research and development cases and from 
other sources, to reduce risks found in the first steps. 
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4. Conclusions are drawn from the information obtained. 
The ranking method used is described "semi-quantitative," using a 1-5 scale, from 1 (minimum 
risk) to 5 (maximum risk), along with a weighting factor for each criteria (for example, in gas 
pre-treatment for NGL extraction, a weighting factor of 15 is used for acid removal, and for 
mercury removal, 1 is used). This method was also used when additioning costs. When the 
degree of knowledge about the technologies is high enough, other areas can be studied, such as 
failure modes and effect analysis of failures (FMEA). 
Pros: This work provides a method to analyze the general uncertainties for new technologies. 
Cons: Even though the work is described as "semi-quantitative," it appears to be mostly 
subjective. Historical, research and development, and other information can be used for 
quantification of risks. Though this method adds some insight into how to evaluate new 
technologies, it does not provide an easy way to generalize the methodology. Another problem is 
that the results of the research may be different for each person evaluating technologies because 
of the subjective information (weighing factors, questionnaires) involved. Also, it does not 
provide accurate cost information. 
2. 11.2. Completion Design for Subsea Wells 
Risk analysis is applied to determine the best completion design for subsea wells using different 
technologies. In [39], different scenarios are compared using available technologies for 
multilateral and intelligent completions. A probabilistic approach using technical, organizational, 
and environmental issues was considered to assess the uncertainties related to well design, cost, 
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and productivity. A case study was performed with two technologies and two scenario options 
for a subsea well design. A fault tree approach was used to allow for multiple criteria being 
considered for failure modes and other issues. After analysis, the costs were converted to a 
$/barrel (bbl) unit for simplified conclusions. 
Different methodologies were considered for qualitative and quantitative analyses. The 
qualitative steps involved identification of uncertainties and evaluation and categorization of 
individual risks, with control plans and mitigation. These allowed for a qualitative risk matrix 
and risk management plan. Quantitative analysis involved cost and duration risk analysis, fault 
tree models (one for each scenario), and technical unit cost calculations. These allowed for risk 
models calculated using Monte Carlo simulations. 
Risks for each operation and technology were identified and described in terms of triggering 
events, probability, and impact. Capital expenditure distributions were created for costs 
associated with each scenario and technology, and sensitivity analysis was performed to 
determine the top seven factors affecting the risk. 
Pros: This is a comprehensive methodology that brings together several standard methods and 
has the potential to improve output. For example, the fault tree analysis incorporates failure 
information. Total risks were converted to $/bbl for simple conclusions. Sensitivity analysis was 
performed to determine the highest contributing criteria for uncertainties. Benefit analysis (cost 
of technologies along with profit from wells) was also computed to offset the risks in each 
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scenano. In general, a broad scope of risks was considered for the application and fault tree 
analysis. 
Cons: A limited scope of application and technologies was considered. 
2.11.3. Risk Analysis on Operations Related to Construction of Oil and Gas 
Production Systems 
Risk analysis related to the construction of oil and gas production systems is described in [ 40]; it 
was used to verify engineering operations involving gravity-based structures over drilled subsea 
wellheads. The economic consequences are great when failures happen because of the remote 
locations of operation; these consequences can lead to months of lost production time. 
The approach to risk analysis was first to determine the causes of failure, and then to develop 
fault trees based on failure probabilities and consequences. Different failure scenarios for the 
installation were considered until all scenarios were exhausted. Finite element analysis (FEA) 
was also performed on the lines connected to the gravity-based structure (GBS), to evaluate 
effects of boat pull and motion of the GBS on lines. Risk analysis was found to be an excellent 
tool to document and guide engineering operations that involve economic or technical risks. 
2. 11.4. Risk Analysis to Upgrade Aging Offshore Lines 
A risk-based analysis used for analyzing upgrades to aging offshore trunk lines is described in 
[ 41]. Concerns were raised about the risk and consequences of failures associated with older 
pipelines. Retrofit costs for existing lines were compared to the costs to repair general failures of 
the aging pipelines. 
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The authors undertook a risk analysis involving the failures that occur during a pipeline's 
lifetime; the cumulative risked capital and total risked capital are calculated using a decision tree. 
Failure rates of pipelines were modeled using probabilities functions, and historical data was 
used to calibrate the probability functions. The following key parameters were highlighted in the 
study: 
1. Internal corrosion 
2. Cost of repairing or replacing leaking pipelines 
3. Consequences ofleaks 
4. Uncertainties in existing corrosion states 
5. Cost of retrofitting the existing inspection systems 
Pros: This is a comprehensive study that considers uncertainties in pipeline corrosion. It also 
provides additional information on the costs to upgrade the lines, while incorporating estimated 
fai 1 ure data. 
Cons: The selection of failure rate density functions is somewhat arbitrary. The methodology for 
using the decision tree is not clear, and no generalization ofthe method is shown. 
2. 12. Need for Further Research 
The above review shows that risk-based analysis is a comprehensive analytical technique and 
that it appears best suited for evaluating any new technology, specifically the subsea leak 
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detection technology which is of particular interest. In addition to that, the quantification of 
criteria to evaluate risk-based scenarios is not straightforward. Therefore, appropriate 
quantification methods need to be developed. 
The main motivations for undertaking this study are discussed in brief below. 
• There is a need to develop a straightforward, efficient model that allows for a 
holistic approach to larger projects and at the same time provides accurate 
analysis. This model should allow for comparison of criteria, while using the 
same methodology for all subjects of evaluation. 
• Subsea leak detection technology is relatively new; information about different 
technologies is scarce and it is not clear which are the important factors for the 
technology. Also, risk-based techniques have not been applied to any similar 
scenario. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive list of evaluation 
criteria for subsea leak detection technology. Furthermore, the scenario 
considered in the current application is unique. Therefore, significant research is 
required to identify the important factors for this particular scenario before a risk-
based analysis can be carried out. 
• Existing models have limitations. In many cases, the assessment is too subjective 
or does not include the consequences, and results are difficult to interpret. Thus, 
there is a need for objective analysis. However, for subsea technology this is 
difficult, since there is limited history of past operation. In order to bring 
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objectivity to the analysis, we need to use other indirect indicators. This requires 
further development in risk calculation using indirect indicators. 
• It is important to understand the economic consequences of choosing one 
technology or application over another when multiple criteria are used. Risk-
based methodology can easily integrate cost information from multiple criteria. 
• Quantitative risk models are acceptable to industry and easy for engineers to use. 
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3. Subsea Leak Detection Evaluation Using Performance Criteria 
3 .1. Executive Summary of Section 
This section evaluates the secondary systems and point sensors for different LDSs that are 
applicable for monitoring of production facilities and subsea pipelines. The evaluation has been 
based on technological performance criteria. Each technology was assigned a score between I 
and 1 0, based on their performance for that specific criterion. Final scores were calculated based 
on a weighted average. Additional weightings are provided for each criteria based on its 
importance. A weighted average of the scores gave the overall score for each technology. From 
this technology evaluation exercise, the following can be concluded: 
• The applicable technologies to monitor a pipeline for subsea Arctic use are: fiber 
optic cable (FOC), based distributed temperature system (DTS), distributed strain 
system (DSS), distributed vibration system (DVS) and distributed acoustic system 
(DAS), and active and passive acoustic sensors. 
• The best technologies for detecting the smallest leak are: FOC DSS, FOC DVS, 
FOC DAS, and passive acoustic systems. 
• The best technologies for locating exact location of leak are observed to be: FOC 
DTS, FOC DVS, FOC DAS, and passive acoustic systems. 
• The best technologies for a buried condition pipeline were: all FOC systems 
The fiber optic cable based and acoustic based cables have high potential to be used for subsea 
applications. However, they need to be tested experimentally to establish minimum thresholds of 
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leak detection and minimum time to detect a leak of that size. Also, more study is required to 
establish the reliability of such LDSs in subsea conditions. This study recommends further 
research and development (R&D) in this area. 
3 .2. Scenario for Case and Calculations 
In Table 3.1, the specification ofthe hypothetical pipeline that was the scenario in this analysis is 
stated. These specifications are based on standard industry practice in the arctic region of 
offshore subsea pipelines. The pipeline is not buried. 
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Table 3. 1: Pipeline Parameters 
Analogue Pipeline Parameters 
OD 610 mm 
WT 19.05 mm 
Operational Pipeline Parameters 
Q 8000 m/\3/hr 
v 8.7 m/s 
p 68.9 bar 
T 60 oc 
Tseawater -1.7 oc 
Oil Density 921.9 kg/m/\3 
Viscosity 103.9 CP 
Specific Heat kg/kg 
Capacity 2.2 c 
Boundary Conditions 
Water Depth 100 m 
Current 0.71 m/s 
Environmental Condition 
Seawater Density 1025 kg/m/\3 
WaveH 15 m 
WaveT 16.1 sec 
For Analogue Pipeline Parameters: 
OD=Outside Diameter of Pipeline (in our case it is approximately NPS 24, 24") 
WT= Wall Thickness ofPipeline 
Operational Parameters 
Q=Fiow rate 
V=Velocity of flow 
P oauoe=68. 9bar 
" " T=Temperature in Celsius 
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3.2.1. Objectives 
The goals of this technology evaluation are: 
• Understand effective subsea and arctic LDSs including, their advantages and 
disadvantages, for the purpose of Arctic subsea pipeline leak detection 
• Compare the performance metrics of each LDS with relation to its; detectability in 
the environment, minimum threshold of leak detection, sensitivity, reliability, and 
robustness 
• Conclude the best suitable LDS for Arctic subsea pipeline leak detection and 
recommend further R&D 
Gathering up to date information on the above aspects will provide information on the current 
state of the technologies, and point towards the need for future R&D. Such a study would 
facilitate implementation of such technologies for testing and application. A pipeline LDS should 
have the capability to: 
• Detect small leaks 
• Locate leaks accurately 
• Reduce Non-leak or false alarm rate 
• Provide sufficient information to respond 
• Provide continuous monitoring along a route 
• Minimize installation, inspection and maintenance requirements. 
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Potential high-risk leak sources are flanges, valves, and fittings. The subsea pipeline may also 
leak due to damage resulting from corrosion, erosion, cracking and rupture. Potential pipeline 
leak scenarios should include all portions of the pipeline during all times of the year, especially 
those that are more conducive to environmental damage and increased economic impact, such as: 
• Very small leaks below the threshold of the LDS at locations such as pipe fittings 
(weeping leaks) 
• Leak scenarios associated with progressive loadings (corrosion, seabed erosion 
features) 
3.2.2. Existing and Emerging LDSs 
The basic purpose of an LDS is to detect leaks. After that, other goals are: to determine where 
the leak is, how big it is, and how much product has been spilled; all in a timely manner with a 
low false-detection rate. The importance of Arctic subsea leak detection technologies has 
increased greatly with continued exploration and production of hydrocarbons from these regions. 
The growth continues due to depleting conventional oil and gas reserves worldwide and the 
increasing energy needs. 
The consequences of pipeline leaks can be; loss of commodity, loss of production due to 
shutdown, the loss due to environmental damage and exposure to legal action. Public and 
political intolerance to large leak events has increased the consequential cost and scope of related 
liabi lities. This trend is likely to continue into the foreseeable future, and there is a direct link 
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between the total volume spilled and liability costs [ 42]. This creates a need for continual 
advancement of LDSs and constant review of existing and upcoming technologies. 
3. 3. Extrinsic/Intrinsic Classification 
Some LDSs use process parameters such as temperature, pressure, flow rate, and others, which 
are typically measured in a pipeline system. These measurements are generally used with 
condition and performance monitoring systems to find trends in pipeline operations. By 
generating historical trends for a pipeline system one can assess how likely leaks will occur 
based on previous measurements of data. 
In general the main method to detect leaks uses Computational Process Monitoring (CPM). This 
involves algorithmic monitoring tools that enhance the abilities of an operator to recognize when 
an anomaly occurs along a pipeline [2]. CPMs are usually categorized as intrinsic methods of 
leak detection and they use a combination of physically measured properties (flow rate, pressure 
waves etc.) and detection algorithms or system models to determine when and where a leak 
occurs. Other primary methods include operational procedures such as shut-in pressure tests. 
These systems are good at detecting large loses of product quickly, but take longer to find 
smaller leaks (if they detect them at all). Some of these methods are [ 43] : 
• Real time transient model (RTTM) 
• Pressure wave modeling 
• Mass balance methods 
• Pressure balance methods 
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In this review, intrinsic leak detection methods will not be covered (due to limitations discussed 
in 3.3 .1 ), as the focus of this review is small chronic leaks that are 1% or less of total flow in 
subsea and arctic conditions. 
Other systems are not based on modeling but instead measure the conditions around the pipeline 
and medium (acoustic information, temperature/pressure of the soil, or water temperature) and 
these are the focus of this study. Categories of LDSs are: continuous monitoring, intermittent 
monitoring, and point/area sensors. Continuous monitoring takes place over the entire course of a 
pipeline (distributed temperature, vacuum sensing); intermittent monitoring involves either all of 
the pipeline, or some part of it intermittently (ROVs with sensors); point sensors are used as 
standalone/area coverage sensors (cameras or acoustic sensors). Systems such as acoustic point 
sensors can be used over the entire length of a pipeline, in effect turning a point sensor into a 
continuous method of detection. Some of the above external sensors can also be attached to 
vehicles such as ROY s for subsea use at different locations along a pipeline. 
3.3.1. Limitations of Using Intrinsic Methods Alone 
Intrinsic leak detection methods are not used alone due to their inability to detect small, chronic 
leaks. Generally intrinsic methods have problems detecting leakage rates of 1% of the flow or 
lower. Also, even if a small leak is detected it is hard to determine how long it has been leaking, 
how much product has spilled, or how large an area the spill covers. 
Subsea pipelines in Arctic conditions are generally in remote locations not easily accessible by 
operational crews, and even during flyovers by aircraft, ice cover can hinder finding oil leaks. 
54 
Risk-based Selection of Subsea Leak Detection Technologies Hillier, A. 
Arctic environments also have very sensitive ecosystems. Spills in these conditions pose 
significant economic and environmental damage, in addition to the damage to reputation a poor 
safety record will bring. A leak of less than 1% of flow for the months that sea is ice-covered can 
be catastrophic. A leak of less than 1% of flow can be hard to detect in a pipeline, and because 
the surface would be covered, flight and ground crews cannot easily witness the spill until the ice 
melts in the spring. Tens of thousands of barrels could spill in such a time frame, severely 
affecting the ecosystem. 
Use of extrinsic leak detection methods outside of the pipeline have been shown to be effective 
in finding small chronic leaks quickly, and almost all new pipelines have at least two systems. 
Nowadays, pipelines in general are constructed with at least one primary LDS for large spills, 
and a secondary method (or a number of secondary methods) for monitoring small spills, as 
mandated by regulatory bodies. Arctic and subsea pipelines especially, have multiple internal 
and extrinsic LDSs for timely and accurate detection of leaks [3]. 
3.4. Comparison ofLDS 
Using information from Chapter 2 on extrinsic leak detection technologies, a methodology was 
developed to score the LDSs. 
3.4.1 . Evaluation Criteria 
The discussed technologies in Chapter 2 were each evaluated with respect to the fo llowing 
criteria for evaluation: 
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Leak detection ability: 
• Smallest leak detectable (or sub 1% flow rate detection) 
• Leak location capability 
• Non-leak (false) alarm rate 
Response: 
• Response time 
• Information provided to user for responding 
Adaptability: 
• Perform with pipeline conditions (startup, shutdown) 
• Functionality without visibi lity (Arctic ice cover) 
• Performance over long distances 
• Temperature/pressure constraints 
• Performance in subsea/buried pipelines 
Implementation: 
• Install-ability 
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Additional Features: 
• Rate or volume quantification 
• Lifespan of LDS 
• Multiuse ability 
These variables are determined subjectively by experts, as specific values have not been 
available in literature. 
3.4.2. Critical Evaluation with Assumptions 
In order to evaluate extrinsic LOSs it was required to make a review for the technologies used 
for Arctic subsea leak detection that did not use intrinsic systems. The LOSs have been discussed 
in Section 3.4 along with the advantages and limitations of each technology. 
The technologies reviewed in Section 3.4 have been evaluated with sconng with regard to 
evaluation criteria based on related industry experience and performance survey, as well as using 
available white papers and product brochures. 
The principal knowledge sources for the technology evaluation are internal INTECSEA 
knowledge, and the work of S. P. Siebenaler [44]. Scores are assigned to each technology based 
on their ability to fulfill the goal. The chart format in Table 3.2 will be used for scoring using a 
scale from 1-10. The highest possible value for scoring is 10 and the lowest value is 1. A score of 
10 means that the technology works satisfactorily for its criterion while a score of 1 is very poor 
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ability to fulfill the concerned criterion. In the event that a criteria does not apply to a technology 
a value of 0 will be assigned. 
After scoring on a scale of 1-10, weights were assigned to each criterion to reflect the relative 
importance of each criterion. 
Table 3.2: Scoring Methodology for LDS Evaluation 
Criterion for Lowest Score ( 1) Mid Score(5) Highest Score( 1 0) 
evaluation (ex. 
Smallest Leak 
Detectable) 
Technology A 
Technology B This area has subjective scoring from the lowest score (1) to the highest 
Etc. score (10) 
A detai led description of parameters used for scoring technologies has been presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3.3: Explanation of Scoring 
Evaluation Criteria Lowest score - I Mid score- 5 Highest score - I 0 
Cannot detect leak until it is at a Can detect leaks below 1% of 
Smallest leak detectable level that a CPM system would nominal flow rate (in general Can detect any leak regardless of 
find. cannot be detected by CPM SIZe. 
systems) 
Can locate a leak within a distance 
Leak location capability Does not provide leak location whereby a survey team or ROY Can locate leak within 1-3 meters 
abilities. could be dispatched to locate the along a span. 
leak site. 
Some alarms, but trending or other 
Non-leak alarm or false alarm rate A large number of false alarms. product-specific capabilities allow No non-leak alarms produced. 
for reduction of alarms. 
Driven by discrete intervals for Provides continuous monitoring 
Response time ground or air crews (ex. weekly Can detect a leak within one day. with the ability to provide leak 
over flights) information within an hour. 
Provides continuous monitoring 
Information provided to operators Provides information such as with ability to detect desired leak 
for responding Only provides an alarm. location and probable leak rate. within one hour and have an 
approximate value for how much 
was spilled. 
Provides detailed diagnostic tools 
Detect leaks during transient System will not detect a leak Provides general information such to allow operator to determine 
conditions (startup, shutdown, etc.) during transient pipeline events. as location and leak rate. validity of leak without having to 
go to leak site. 
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Functionality without visibility Does not work if leak can't be Uncertainty IS increased m poor Does not rely upon direct "line of 
(cannot see through environment) visibly detected weather conditions sight" 
Perfom1ance over long distances Discrete sensors make continuous Allows for continuous monitoring Can be installed over a distance of 
mounting unfeasible. on the order of several km. 100km. 
Temperature constraints Cannot operate In particular Uncertainty is increased in extreme Works In any temperature 
temperature environment temperature. condition. 
Pressure constraints Cannot operate ll1 particular Uncertainty is increased in extreme Works in any pressure range. pressure environment pressure. 
Performance on above ground Cannot work on seabed, subsea Uncertainty mcreases when used Surrounding water does not effect 
subsea pipelines environment. on seabed subsea. operation. 
Performance on (subsea) buried Cannot work in buried condition. Uncertainty increases when used in Operation is not affected by being pipelines buried condition. buried. 
Would reqmre significant work Could be installed without large Does not require any Install-ability (only assembled when originally hardware/power source to be 
constructed). infrastructure changes. installed along pipeline. 
Can only determine that there was The system can make a Can detennine amount of leaked Rate or volume quantification 
a leak. determination as to whether the product accurately to within leak is "small" or " large" several barrels. 
Would only last Would reqmre periodic Could be installed and Lifespan of LDS one year ll1 maintenance in order to have an remam on 
service. 
extended life. pipeline for up to 30 years or more. 
Single use after being "tripped" and Being "tripped" may affect future Doesn't need to be reset and will 
Multiuse of sensor/ Reset ability cannot continue to detect future sensor readings/may require reset function well after being "tripped" 
leaks. or maintenance. multiple times. 
Note: Lifespan without significant maintenance 0-15 years = 7. 15-30 years and > years = 10.[8] 
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In addition to the mentioned scores of evaluation criteria, the following weightings were 
assigned to each criterion to arrive at distinctive conclusions. The allocated weights are based on 
the importance of the criteria in detecting and locating leaks accurately. 
Table 3.4: Criteria Weighting 
Evaluation Criteria Weight Description 
Smallest Leak detectable 10 High weight, being the ( detectability < 1% of flow) most critical criteria 
Leak location-identification 10 High weight, being the 
most critical criteria 
Non-leak alarm or false alarm 9 Very important, not 
rate mandatory, but desirable 
Response time 9 Very important, not 
mandatory, but desirable 
Information provided to 9 Very important, not 
respond mandatory, but desirable 
Detect leaks with transient Important, but not 
conditions (startup, shutdown, 8 necessary as steady state is 
etc) assumed 
Functionality without visibility 9 Very important, not 
mandatory, but desirable 
Performance long Important, but not over 7 multiple intervals necessary as 
sensors can fix it 
Temperature constraints 6 Relevant, not a limiting 
criteria 
Pressure constraints 6 Relevant, not a limiting 
criteria 
Performance on above ground 8 Important and necessary 
subsea pipelines 
Performance on buried subsea 8 Important and necessary pipelines 
Install ability 7 Important, but light as far 
as technology is concerned 
Rate or volume classification 8 Very important 
Lifespan of LDS 4 Should be reasonable 
Multiuse 4 Should be reasonable 
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The following mathematical relationship applies after a score and weight is given: 
If=t[Si*Wi] 
Total Weighted Average Wav = (Sm) (1) 
Where Sm= Total sum of maximum scoring of total elements (for our case, 160 from 16 criteria), 
Wav= Weighted average rank for each technology, si= Individual score for each technology, wi = 
Weight of each criteria. 
3.4.3. Evaluation Scores for LDS 
In this section, scores are assigned to each technology for various performance criteria [1 0], 
(11] , [17], and [44]. Using Table 3.4, the following tables are made to explain the evaluation 
method for the technologies in this section. 
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Table 3.5: Vapor Sensing Tube Scoring 
Vapor Sensing Tube 
Evaluation Criteria Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score 
Smallest Leak Various vendors claim that systems detect very small 7 10 70 leaks < I% of flow [10] 
Leak location The leak location for gas tubing is around 25m 8 10 80 
Non-leak alarm or Sources other than a direct gas leak (natural releases) 4 9 36 fa lse alarm rate may be detected, leading to more false alarms. 
Response time Response time based on when vacuumed could be 6 9 54 
several hours in between. 
Information provided 
System provides location of leak. 7 9 63 to respond 
Perform with p ipeline The system is not re liant upon, or affected by pipeline 9 8 72 
conditions conditions. 
Functionality without 
Not affected. 10 9 90 
visibil ity 
Performance over long The system can be installed over distances in the order 7 7 49 interval of 15km, the performance decreases at length. 
Temperature 
Reduced detection sensitivity for low temperatures. 7 6 42 
constraints 
Pressure constraints Used in 30m water depth (Northstar pipeline in 4 6 24 Alaska), but tested for up to 120m. 
Perform subsea on Subsea to 30m, below ground yes. (separate in future 8 8 64 
seabed iterations) 
Performance on buried Doesn't work well buried due to travel paths associated 
" 8 24 
subsea pipelines with oil and gas. 
.) 
Install abi I ity Easily attached 8 7 56 
Rate or volume Concentrations only. 5 8 40 
classification 
Lifespan of LOS Can last up to 15 years without s ignificant 7 4 28 
maintenance. 
Multiuse Long use between maintenance. 9 4 36 
Overall score 109 828 
Note: Project experience with Alaskan Northstar pipeline 
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Table 3.6: Capacitance Sensor Scoring 
Capacitance Sensor 
Evaluation 
Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score Criteria 
It was found for a gas leak that for a nozzle with 0.17mm 
diameter and a b.P of 5, it was 540 seconds before a I 00% 
Smallest Leak reading from the sensor. A 0.7mm nozzle only took 9 sees 6 10 60 for the same 100% reading. Liquid crude leaks took longer 
and were prone to coalescence in the steel shroud collector 
[ 11] 0 
Leak location The leak location for gas tubing is around 25m 2 10 20 
Non-leak or fa lse Sources other than a direct gas leak (natural releases) may 6 9 54 
a larm rate be detected, leading to more false alarms. 
Response time Response time based on when first alarm occurs after leak. 6 9 54 
Information 
provided to System provides location of leak. 7 9 63 
respond 
Perform with 
The system is not re liant upon, or affected by pipeline pipeline 10 8 80 
conditions conditions. 
Functionality 
Not affected. 10 9 90 
without visibi lity 
Performance over The system is usually only placed as a point sensor I 7 7 long interval covering a few square meters. 
Temperature Sensor generally not affected. Working range of sensor - 1 0 9 6 54 
constraints to 40 Celsius. 
Pressure 
Pressure tested to deep-water 400bar (4000 meters). 10 6 60 
constraints 
Perform subsea on 
Subsea to 400bar (4000 meters) 10 8 80 
seabed 
Performance on Does not work well in soil due to requiring oil and gas buried subsea 3 8 24 
pipe lines transportation to sensor. 
Install abi lity Construction for shroud required over subsea template. As 6 7 42 
a point sensor it is not suitable for p ipelines. 
Rate or volume Concentrations on ly. 6 8 48 
classification 
Lifespan of LOS 25 years without significant maintenance. 10 4 40 
Multiuse Able to be used continuously. 10 4 40 
Overall score 11 2 816 
Notes: Most common subsea sensor for subsea installations. 
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Table 3.7: FOC-Based Distributed Temperature Sensing 
FOC-Based Distributed Temperature Sensing (DTS) 
Evaluation Criteria Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score 
Various vendors claim that systems detect very small 
Smallest Leak leaks. A quantitative value is unknown, though 8 10 80 temperature of 1-3 degree difference in environment has 
been recorded [I 0]. 
Leak location The leak location for gas tubing is around I m per I 0 krn 10 10 100 
of pipe depend ing on FOC material and size. 
Sources other than a pipe leak may set off alarms. Spring 
Non-leak or false runoffs in an arctic zone or a buried pipeline becoming 
6 9 54 a larm rate uncovered are examples that may cause temperature 
fluctuations. 
Response time very quick for large temperature changes 
Response time (less than I min), and l-3K/min was found for smaller 10 9 90 leaks. (typica lly 20sec to 5mins, with normal within 
2m in) 
Information provided System provides location of leak and temperature 9 9 81 to respond variance. 
Perform with pipeline The system is not reliant upon, or affected by pipeline 8 8 64 
conditions conditions. 
Functiona lity without Not affected. 10 9 90 
visibility 
Performance over long The system can be installed over distances in the order of 9 7 63 interva l 30 km, and range extenders increase this to I OOkrn. 
Temperatures near the product flow temperature will 
Temperature cause this technology to stop reading spi lls. It is unlike ly 
5 6 30 
constraints though the environment will have the same temperature 
as the flow. 
Pressure constra ints Not affected. 10 6 60 
Perform subsea on Subsea to extreme depths. 10 8 80 
seabed 
Performance on buried Buried works well to measure surrounding and soil 10 8 80 
subsea pipelines temperature. 
Install ability Easi ly attached to pipe. Must be attached to whole length. 5 7 35 
Time of change in temperature will give approximate 
Rate or volume leak size and rate. Slow temperature change means 6 8 48 
c lassification relatively sma ll, while fast temperature change means 
large spi ll. 
Lifespan of LOS Over 15 years life without signi ficant maintenance. 10 4 40 
Multiuse Sensor is not affected by being "tripped" continuous ly. 10 4 40 
Overall score 136 1035 
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Table 3.8: FOC-Based Distributed Stra in Sensing 
FOC-Based Distributed Strain Sensing (DSS) 
Evaluation 
Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score Criteria 
Smallest Leak Detects changes as low as 6 micro strain along a 9 10 90 pipeline [10] 
Leak location Within 10m 7 10 70 
Non-leak alarm Low false a larm rate as cable attached permanently to 8 9 72 
rate pipe. 
Response time FOC has a 20sec to 5 min response time, the average 10 9 90 
around 2m ins. 
Information System provides location of leak and 
provided to strain/vibration/acoustic information, where one can 8 9 72 
respond assume hole size based on turbu lence received . 
Perfom1 with The system is not reliant upon pipeline conditions, but 
pipeline wi ll be affected by nearby mechanical dev ices, such as 6 8 48 
conditions pumps and valves. 
Functional ity Not affected. 10 9 90 
without visibi lity 
Performance 
The system can be installed over distances in the order 
over long 9 7 63 
interval of 30 km, and range extenders increase this to 1 OOkm. 
Temperature On ly extreme temperatures may affect the strain in the 
constraints cables due to temperature expansion, however for any 8 6 48 
conditions of measurement temperate is a factor. 
Pressure Not affected. 10 6 60 
constraints 
Perform subsea Subsea to extreme depths. 10 8 80 
on seabed 
Buried Pipeline Buried works well to measure strains and impact 10 8 80 
sounds on ocean floor. 
Easily attached to pipe, two fibers required 90 degrees 
Install ability apart for 2-axis strain detection. Cable must be fully 6 7 42 
adhered to the pipe. 
Rate or vo lume Time of change In strain wi ll give approximate 
c lassification conditions around pipe but wi ll not allow estimation of 7 8 56 leak s ize. 
Lifespan of LOS Over 15 years life without significant maintenance. 7 4 28 
Multiuse Sensor is not affected by being "tripped" continuously. 10 4 40 
Overall score 135 1029 
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Table 3.9: FOC-Based Distributed Strain Sensing 
FOC-Based Distributed Strain Sensing (DSS) 
Evaluation Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score Criteria 
Sma llest Leak Detects changes as low as 6 mtcro strain along a 9 10 90 pipeline [I 0] 
Leak location Within 10m 7 10 70 
Non-leak or Low false alarm rate as cable attached permanently to 8 9 72 fal se a larm rate ptpe. 
Response time FOC has a 20 sec to 5 min response time, the average 10 9 90 
around 2 mins. 
Information System provides location of leak and 
prov ided to strain/vibration/acoustic information, where one can 8 9 72 
respond assume hole size based on turbulence received. 
Perform w ith The system is not reliant upon pipe line conditions, but 
pipeline wi ll be affected by nearby mechanical devices, such as 6 8 48 
conditions pumps and valves. 
Functionality 
Not affected. 10 9 90 
without visibility 
Performance The system can be installed over distances in the order 
over long 9 7 63 
interval of 30 km, and range extenders increase th is to I OOkm. 
Temperature On ly extreme temperatures may affect the strain in the 
constraints cables due to temperature expansion, however for any 8 6 48 
cond it ions of measurement temperate is a factor. 
Pressure 
Not affected. 10 6 60 
constraints 
Perform subsea Subsea to extreme depths. 10 8 80 
on seabed 
Buried Pipe line Buried works wel l to measure stra ins and impact 10 8 80 
sounds on ocean floor. 
Easily attached to pipe, two fibers required 90 degrees 
Install ability apart for 2-axis strain detection. Cable must be fully 6 7 42 
adhered to the pipe. 
Rate or vo lume T ime of change 111 strain wi ll gtve approximate 
c lassification conditions around pipe but wil l not allow estimation of 7 8 56 
leak size. 
Lifespan of LOS Over 15 years li fe without significant maintenance. 7 4 28 
Mu ltiuse Sensor is not affected by be ing "tripped" continuously. 10 4 40 
Overa ll score 135 1029 
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Table 3.10: FOC-Based Distributed Vibration/ Acoustic Sensing 
FOC-Based Distributed Vibration/Acoustic Sensing (DVS/DAS) 
Evaluation Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score Criteria 
Smallest Leak Sensitive to small leaks of ~34 barrels per day. [I OJ 9 10 90 
Leak location Within 3m 9 10 90 
Non-leak alarm Sensitivity picks up ice scouring, anchor drops, and 5 9 45 rate other subsea disturbances may increase false alarm rate. 
Response time FOC has a 20 sec to 5 min response time, the average 10 9 90 
around 2 mins. 
Information System provides location of leak and vibration/acoustic 
provided to information, where one can assume a hole size based on 10 9 90 
respond turbulence received. 
Perform with The system is not reliant upon pipeline condition, but 
pipeline wi ll be affected by nearby mechanical devices, such as 8 8 64 
conditions pumps and valves. 
Functionality Not affected. 10 9 90 without visibility 
Performance 
The system can be installed over distances in the order 
over long 9 7 63 
interval of 30 km, and range extenders increase this to I OOkm. 
Temperature Only extreme temperatures may affect the strain in the 
constraints cables due to temperature expansion and affect some 9 6 54 
readings. 
Pressure Not affected. 10 6 60 
constraints 
Perform subsea Subsea to extreme depths. 10 8 80 
on seabed 
Performance on Buried works well to measure strains and impact sounds buried subsea 10 8 80 
pipelines on ocean floor. 
Install abi lity Easily attached to pipe. Cable must be fu lly adhered to 7 7 49 the pipe. 
Rate or volume Acoustics will give approximate conditions around pipe 7 8 56 
classification but wi ll not allow estimation of leak size. 
Lifespan of LDS Over 15 year's life without significant maintenance. 7 4 28 
Multiuse Not affected by being "tripped" continuously. 10 4 40 
Overal l score 141 1069 
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Table 3. 11: Acoustic (Active) Sensors 
Acoustic (Active) Sensors 
Evaluation Criteria Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score 
Due to different densities, active sensors are very sensitive to gas, but 
not as sensitive to oil in the presence of water. It was found that a 
Smallest Leak 0 .17mm nozzle with a ~p of I bar at 7m was barely detectable, whi le at 7 10 70 4.5m it was detectable. For crude oil, a 0.7mm nozzle at 2.5m with a ~p 
of 5 bar was bare ly detectab le, while a 0.7mm nozzle at 2.5m with a ~p 
o f 15 bar was detectable [ I I] . It may be difficult to detect weeping leaks. 
The leak location for a source can be placed within - l m (other 
Leak location conditions apply however, like spacing of sensors, and distance from a 8 10 80 
sensor) 
Non-leak or fa lse Sources o ther than a di rect leaks may be picked up, though due to the 
a larm rate high frequency sounds used like radar background sounds will not affect 5 9 45 
the sensor as much as passive acoustics. 
Response t ime Response time is almost instant in a continuous monitoring situation. 9 9 8 1 
Information provided 
System provides location of pressure difference in fluid in an area. 6 9 54 to respond 
Perform with pipeline The system is reliant on pipel ine flow (pressure in lines) to accurate ly 5 8 40 
conditions find leaks. 
Functionality without 
Not affected. 10 9 90 vis ibility 
Performance over long The system can be insta lled to I OOkm or more with distances with 
8 7 56 interval spacing's of up to 200m each. 
Temperature 
Not affected. 10 6 60 
constra ints 
Pressure constra ints Not affected. 10 6 60 
Perform subsea on 
Perfo rmance on seabed is very good. 10 8 80 
seabed 
Performance on buried 
Being buried will not work well w ith sound. 2 8 16 
subsea pipelines 
Due to power constra ints and telecommunication between stations, 
Install ability construction of stations 200m apart would take considerable time over 2 7 14 
long pipelines. 
Rate or volume Sound waves due to pressure variation d ifferences in a leak should cause 7 8 56 
classification operators to take note when leaks are large or small 
Lifespan ofLDS Requi res periodic maintenance for extended life (especially when used 6 4 24 to continuously monitor a pipeline. 
Multiuse Able to be used continuously. 10 4 40 
Overa ll score 11 5 866 
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Table 3. 12: Acoustic (Passive) Sensors 
Acoustic (Passive) Sensors 
Total 
Evaluation Criteria Description Score Weight Weighted 
Score 
Ormen Lange leak detection test paper: gases with 25sl/min at dP=5bar, and oil 
leaks 5 I/ min at dP=5bar.For ClampON product data sheet: dP> I bar for gas, 
Smallest Leak dP>3 bar for liquid with a min leak rate of 0. 11/min. Cannot detect "weeping" 9 10 90 
leaks. [ 17] Smart Ball can detect - 0.5 gpm of flow through holes - I mm in s ize, 
though further oil and gas testing is required [45]. 
Leak location The leak location for a source can be placed within I m (other conditions apply 9 10 90 however, like spacing of sensors, and distance from a sensor) 
Sources other than direct leaks may be picked up, and it is only good at detecting 
Non-leak or fal se leaks in environments without significant background noise. SmartBall testing in 5 9 45 
alarm rate pipelines also found that the outer shell should be softer to avoid excess noise 
while travelling in the pipeline. 
Response time Response time is almost instant in a continuous monitoring situation. 9 9 81 
Information provided System provides location of leak, records sounds for playback, and can be used in 8 9 72 to respond frequency analysis. More intense sounds may imply a larger leak. 
Perform with pipeline 
The system is reliant on pipeline flow (pressure in lines) to accurately find leaks. 5 8 40 
conditions 
Functionality without 
Not affected. 10 9 90 
visibi lity 
Performance over The system can be installed to I OOkm or more with distances with spacing's of up 
8 7 56 long interval to 200m each. 
Temperature 
Not affected. 10 6 60 
constraints 
Pressure constra ints Not affected . 10 6 60 
Perform subsea on 
Performance on seabed is very good. 10 8 80 
seabed 
Performance on 
buried subsea Being buried will not work well wi th sound. (though SmartBall would be fine) 3 8 24 
pipelines 
Install ab ility Due to power constraints and telecommunication between stations, construction 2 7 14 
of stations 200m apart would take considerable time over long pipelines. 
Rate or volume Sound waves due to pressure variation differences in a leak should cause 9 8 72 
classification operators to take note when leaks are large or small 
Lifespan of LOS Requires periodic maintenance for extended life (especially when used to 6 4 24 
continuously monitor a pipeline and not used as a point sensor). 
Multiuse Able to be used continuous ly. 10 4 40 
Overa ll score 123 938 
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Table 3.13: ROV Mounted Optical Sensing Methods 
ROY Mounted Optical Sensing Methods 
Evaluation Criteria Description Score Weight Tota l Weighted Score 
Smaller leaks than C PM can be detected, but the leaks must 
Smallest Leak visib le. Vendors claim - lppb at Sm. Requi res use of 7 10 70 
fluorescence in fluid [10] . 
Leak location If leak visible should be placed within several meters. 9 10 90 
Non-leak or fa lse alarm rate Many events may cause the system to produce non-leak alarms. 6 9 54 
Response time Response time is instant based on observer seeing a contro l 
screen. 
10 9 90 
Information provided to System provides visua l indication of leak. 5 9 45 
respond 
Perform with pipeline The system is not re liant upon, or affected by pipeline 10 8 80 
conditions conditions. 
Functiona lity without 
Does not function. 1 9 9 
vis ibility 
Performance over long 
System not reasonable over long distances. 2 7 14 interval 
Temperature constra ints For infrared it can cause significant degrading of performance. 10 6 60 
Pressure constra ints Extreme depths may affect camera or equipment. 5 6 30 
Perform subsea on seabed Can be used to monitor pipes on seabed, or if they are buried for 8 8 64 
seepage from soil. 
Performance on buried Cannot be used on buried pipelines. 1 8 8 
subsea pipelines 
Install ability Point sensors are relatively easily attached to subsea structures. 9 7 63 
Rate or volume 
Can only detect visually small or large leak. 4 8 32 
c lassification 
Lifespan of LOS Not permanently installed, and not subject to lifespan issues (as 7 4 28 
they are changed periodically, light bulb - 10 years) 
Multiuse Will work for considerable use without maintenance is required. 7 4 28 
Overall score 10 1 765 
Note: Not a continuous form of monitoring; can only be in one location at a time over aJ'ill_eline. 
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Table 3.14: Mechanical Device 
Mechanical Device 
Evaluation Criteria Description Score Weight Total Weighted Score 
These mechanical sensors require the release of a product, usually 
a gas that wi ll physically raise a container and trip a sensor. Many 
Smallest Leak variables come into play in how a gas would migrate to these 5 10 50 hoods covering templates. It is likely that at least a barrel or more 
of gas would need to be released under a hood before the sensor 
is tripped . 
Leak location Due to being built over subsea structures, it has limited areal 3 10 30 
coverage. 
on-leak or false alarm rate Sources other than a direct gas leak (natural releases) may be 3 9 27 detected, leading to more false a larms. 
Response time Th is is based on how fast a mechanical sensor is tripped. It could 4 9 36 be a long or short time. 
Information provided to System provides general location of leak. 5 9 45 
respond 
Perform with pipeline The system is not reliant upon, or affected by pipeline conditions. 10 8 80 
conditions 
Functionality without Not affected. 10 9 90 
vis ibili ty 
Performance over long The system can be insta lled over distances in the order of 15 km, I 7 7 interval the performance decreases at length. 
Temperature constra ints Not affected. 10 6 60 
Perform subsea on seabed Subsea, to great depths. 8 6 48 
Performance on buried Would not be useful below ground. I 8 8 
subsea pipelines 
Install abi lity Easily dropped and insta lled, though construction for support may 5 8 40 be req uired. 
Rate or volume Q uantity known only to trip sensor. I 7 7 
c lassification 
Lifespan ofLDS May require maintenance after period of time due to components 6 8 48 insta lled. 
Multiuse After being "tripped" may require maintenance to return to 5 4 20 
previous condition. 
Overall score 77 308 
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3.4.4. Comparison of LDS Performance 
A summary is presented on the next page (Table 3.15) that compares the information gathered in 
3.4.3. The weighted average is calculated and shown for the different technologies compared. 
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Table 3.15: Comparison of LDS Performa nce 
LOS Total Weighted Best Evaluation Criteria 
Score Average 
Can locate leak well 
VSS 109 5.18 Can perform subsea Not reliant upon pipeline conditions 
Long use between maintenance 
Not reliant upon pipe line conditions 
Capacitance 112 5. 1 Subsea/Extreme pressure tested 
Long time between maintenance 
Excellent Leak location 
Excellent response time 
FOC-Based Subsea/Extreme pressures 
Distributed 136 6.47 Buried condition works excellently 
Temperature Sensors Long time between maintenance 
Excellent response time 
Long range deployment 
Excellent strain detection 
FOC-Based Excellent response time 
Distributed Strain 135 6.43 Subsea/Extreme pressures 
Sensors Buried condition works excellent ly Excellent response time 
Long range deployment 
Excellent vibration and acoustic detection 
Exce llent response time 
FOC-Based Excellent information provided for leak 
D istributed 141 6.73 site 
Vibration/ Acoustic Subsea/Extreme pressures 
Buried condition works excellently 
Long range deployment 
Acoustic Sensor 11 5 5.73 Good response time (Active) Subsea/Extreme pressure 
Acoustic Sensor Great leak detection threshold 123 5.86 Great leak location (Passive) Not affected by temperature or pressure 
ROY Mounted 101 4.78 Excellent response time Opt ical Sensors Not affected by pipeline condition 
Mechanical Devices 77 1.1 93 Not affected by pipeline condition 
Notes: Weighted Average is the Weighted Score from the above section 
6. b) ii) div ided by 160, the total possible score. Say its no rmalized to the 
tota l possible score 
74 
Risk-based Selection of Subsea Leak Detection Technologies Hillier, A. 
3.4.5. Summary 
From the above analysis on the technologies evaluated the following conclusions are derived: 
• It is clear from the above quantitative analysis that the best suited overall 
technologies for subsea leak detection monitoring are FOC-based distributed 
sensors (all three above scored well), with the best being the distributed strain, 
and acoustic capabilities. 
• There may be special requirements where a technology scoring high may not be 
the best choice, for example, in the case that a priority is placed on measuring 
temperature changes, one would want to use FOC-distributed temperature 
sensors. 
• Passive acoustic sensors scored well, and these point sensors can be distributed 
along a pipeline for maximum coverage. These also scored the highest out of all 
technologies for the ability to classify the sizes of leaks. 
• It is evident from the above analysis that optical sensors mounted on ROVs and 
mechanical devices have poor capabilities for the purpose of continuous pipeline 
monitoring. 
• The best technologies to monitor a pipeline for small leaks in Arctic subsea 
application based on the weighted average criteria are: FOC-based DTS, DSS, 
DVS/DAS systems and passive acoustic sensors. 
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• All technologies evaluated work satisfactorily for a pipeline on seabed, though 
FOC systems, acoustics (both active and passive), and capacitance performed 
superiorly. 
3.4.6. Limitations of Evaluation and Future Work 
The fo llowing limitations should be noted: 
• This study is based on available literature and under certain assumptions outlined 
in Section 3.2. Therefore, there could be elements of subjectivity in the analysis. 
• Due to the lack of experimental data for technologies, this analysis may be 
considered preliminary. 
• Each leak detection technology uses several sensors. Quantification of the leak 
detectability is dependent on the performance of individual sensors; therefore 
more vendor inputs are required to assess the performance of respective LDS. 
• A percent concentration in a fluid being measured by a capacitance sensor or 
vapor sensor can be quantified, while the same quantification cannot be used with 
a temperature/strain/vibration measuring FOC as both operate on different 
principles. 
• It is possible to j udge each technology based on the overall score and weighted 
average. This was done above in Section 3.4.3. However, in some cases, 
comparison of one technology to another is not entirely accurate due to different 
principles of operation, criteria selected, and so on. For example, intrinsic 
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methods of detection were not considered, even though most of the same criteria 
apply to them. 
• No distinction was made in scoring for oil as opposed to gas leak detection. A 
further study could study each specific technology and create scoring evaluation 
criteria to focus only on gas or oil detection. To balance this limitation, the 
minimum amounts of detectability of oil or gas have been mentioned in the 
smallest leak detection, wherever possible. 
• Weights were assigned as all parameters are not equally significant. For this, 
industry and expert analysis was used to assign weights. In all cases, parameter 
weights are calculated subjectively based on industry requirements. 
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4. Subsea Leak Detection Technologies: Risk-based Decision Making 
4.1. Executive Summary 
This section presents an evaluation of the Leak Detection System (LOS) based on risk. Risk is 
defined as the combination of consequences of an LOS failure and the likelihood of an LOS 
failure. Both objective and subjective analysis, based on research and industry information, were 
used to evaluate the technologies. 
A comparative study was carried out on seven technologies based on different parameters. For 
risk calculations, the study took into account factors that affect operations, maintenance, and the 
environment. Based on the calculations, it has been concluded that fiber optic cable temperature, 
strain, and vacuum tube LOS have the least risk. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 of this paper provides an overview of the 
methodology; 4.5 deals with the ranking methodology, 4.7 with the objective methodology, and 
4.10 with conclusions. 
4.2. Risk-Based Decision-Making Methodology 
The architecture of the risk-based methodology is shown in Figure 4.1. The methodology is 
applicable to all subsea leak detection technologies, though the current evaluation is limited to 
extrinsic methods of leak detection. The first step involves short-listing technologies for 
evaluation, and then all necessary information is collected, using historical and/or subjective 
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information for the calculation of risk. Subsequently, based on the risk, these technologies are 
ranked. The details of the methodology are described in subsequent sections. 
Assess probability of 
excet:dance for the 
given paran1eter 
mmmmm mm l m ..... .! 
4 .3 
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·----------·-·~ 
List technologi<:s and choose one 
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Appendix I 
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Process 
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Figure 4.1: Risk-Based Decision-Making Methodology 
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4.3 . List of Technologies 
The following table lists all technologies that were considered in the comparative study. 
Table 4.1 : Letters representing technology 
Key 
FOC Temperature A 
FOC Strain B 
FOC Acoustic c 
Pipe-in-pipe Vacuum D 
Vacuum Tube E 
Passive Acoustic F 
Active Acoustic G 
These technologies were selected for the comparative study considering detection limits and 
scenario applicability (i.e., ability to detect small, chronic leaks from subsea pipelines, especially 
in arctic conditions). 
Each of the technologies was evaluated based on all relevant criteria; scores were assigned based 
on objective and subjective information. 
4.4. Identification of Evaluation Criteria and Information-Gathering 
Each technology was assessed based on three main criteria; further, each criterion was divided 
into several sub-criteria. A summary of the factors affecting the technology evaluation is given in 
Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 , and Figure 4.4. The relative weight of each evaluation criterion is given in 
brackets. These values were subsequently used for overall risk calculation (Section 4.7). 
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The first category for evaluating leak detection technologies was based on technological factors. 
Five factors were assessed, each of which was divided into further sub-factors: maturity of 
technology, subdivided into commercial availability and level of maturity; effect of pipeline 
flow, subdivided into pressure range, temperature range, flow rate, and solid content; 
implementation difficulty, subdivided into construction, pipeline distance coverage, and 
equipment and personnel requirements; and regional considerations, subdivided into local factors 
of depth, water temperature, water clarity, pipeline buried condition, and tides. 
The second category for evaluating leak detection technologies was based on operational factors. 
Three factors were considered (some with sub-factors): PoF, maintenance (with design life and 
mean time between failures as sub-factors), and decommissioning. 
The third category for evaluation was based on environmental factors. Two factors were 
considered: Detectable percent of flow, and clean up cost. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY 
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Figure 4.2: Factors affecting technology 
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Figure 4.4: Factors affecting the environment 
Further details of each criterion are described in subsequent sections. 
4.5. Ranking Methodology 
4.5.1. Technology Scores 
In this section, the subjective and objective criteria from Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.4 
are detailed. Each subjective parameter is scored on a relative ranking scale described in Ranking 
Table 4.2. Each parameter can have a score of 1-9, and this acts as the consequence in the "risk 
equals consequence multiplied by failure" equation. 
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Table 4.2: Ranking 
Affected Detection Level (Flow 
Conditions/Regional Resi lience of Technology Difficulty ( Integ ration 
Rank Ranking/Maturity Scale Considerations) ( Implementation) Abi lity) 
Cannot be installed without 
9 Basic principles observed and rep01ted Detection is severely affected damaging technology Very difficult 
Technology/concept and/or application High level probability of 
8 formu lated Detection is affected harm Difficult 
Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of Detecting is moderately 
7 concept affected Moderate harm Somewhat difficult 
Component and/or breadboard validation Detection level affected is 
6 in a laboratory environment minor Minor harm Minor d ifficulty 
Component and/or breadboard validation Unknown if harmed during 
5 in a relevant environment Unable to determine if affected installation U nknown difficulty 
System/subsystem model or prototype 
4 demonstration in a relevant environment Probability of detection affected Probable harm Possibly difficulty 
System prototype demonstration in an Low probability of 
3 operation environment Low probability affected Low probability of harm difficulty 
Actual system completed qual ified Very low probability of Very low probability of 
2 through successful mission operations Very low probability affected harm difficulty 
System proven through successful mission Easily installed without N o difficulty (re lative) 
I operations Not affected at all harm to technology present 
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4.5.2. Technological and Operational Factors 
In this section we describe the criteria for further understanding of headings in Figures 9 and 10 
and discuss the rationale behind the ranks assigned to the technologies for various technological 
factors. 
4.5.2.1 . Technological Maturity 
In order to assess technological maturity, information was gathered on the commercial 
availability and the level of maturity of each technology. The best technologies overall were 
FOC strain, and then FOC temperature and acoustic. 
Commercial availability is a good indication of the readiness of the technology. It is reasonable 
to assume that any technology reaching this stage has undergone significant research and 
development. Commercial availability was determined based on information from vendors of 
different technologies. The information collected is processed following the methodology m 
Section 4. 7 and shows that the best technology is passive acoustic. 
Technological maturity is assessed based on the year in which the technology was first used for 
leak detection (even if not for the specific subsea scenario). The longer a technology was on the 
market, the better, as vendors had more time to fix any limitations and the technology was at a 
more mature state. The results of the technology maturity assessment are presented in Section 4. 7 
and show that the best technologies are vacuum/vapor-sensing tubes. 
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4.5 .2.2. Pipeline Conditions 
Pipeline conditions refer to the flow conditions and the effectiveness each LOS for various 
conditions. The four criteria are flow rate, solid content, pressure ranges during operation, and 
temperature. 
For flow rate, a fully developed turbulent flow in a pipe network creates an acoustic signal, even 
without moving parts or mechanical components [ 46]. Thus, the flow rate has a direct effect on 
the acoustic noise level and variation created. Understandably, acoustic-based detection 
technologies (FOC acoustic cable, passive and active acoustic) are affected. Even though 
acoustic signal generation from flow within a pipe is not constant, trends have been recorded, 
and monitoring for leaks can be assumed to be reliable, as the technologies have been used on 
subsea production platforms and pipelines [8]. It would be fair to assess the probability of 
affecting the acoustic-based technologies as 4, because there is a probability of detection being 
affected by flow generating a background noise that may rise above the level of very small leaks. 
The rest of the technologies are not affected; thus, they have a rank of 1 and are the better 
technologies for this criterion. 
Solid content causes an effect similar to the flow rate. When solid content strikes the walls of a 
pipeline, more sound is generated than by liquid. It tends to affect the acoustic signals generated 
from a pipeline [ 4 7]. Even with proper trend monitoring, it is possible that leaks could be missed 
with FOC acoustic technology/passive acoustic technologies. The potential problems related to 
this parameter would cause minor detection problems, so a level of 6 is assigned in the ranking 
table. There is a very low probability of active acoustic being affected because it records sound 
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waves that return whi le travelling through different densities/mediums; therefore, a rank of 2 is 
chosen. All other technologies are ranked as 1, since they are not affected. 
The pipeline pressure affects the discharge rate of leaks into the surrounding water. A number of 
acoustic technologies detect leaks based on leak rate at a distance, for a given difference in 
pressure (Figure 2.6). In general, the greater the pressure difference, the better detection with all 
acoustic technologies. FOC acoustic and passive acoustic technologies rely almost completely on 
pressure difference to detect leaks [9],[ 48]. It is estimated that the detection would be moderately 
affected for FOC acoustic, so a rank of 7 is assigned. For active acoustic, the measurement 
principle is based on the difference of densities of fluid and gas in water and the resulting 
reflected sound wave as it passes through those densities. The detection of oil in water relies 
upon the oil pooling. This is affected by a number of environmental conditions, though generally 
active acoustic technologies would not be affected by ejection pressure; therefore, a rank of 1 IS 
assigned. 
Due to the nature of detection, temperature changes in the flow generally only affect FOC 
temperature. The range of detectable temperature in FOC can be from -27°C to 1 00°C [49]. 
Trend-monitoring techniques are used so that false positives are unlikely (e.g., arctic runoff in 
shallow areas). It should be noted that as the flow changes (especially in multiphase flow, where 
downstream gases expand and cool), temperature readings can vary along a strand of pipe. This 
would lead to the detection being affected in a minor way, resulting in a rank of 3. The rest of the 
technologies are unaffected by temperature and score well with 1. 
88 
Risk-based Selection of Subsea Leak Detection Technologies Hillier, A. 
4.5.2.3. Implementation 
Implementation involves the difficulty of construction, as well as equipment and personnel 
requirements and the maximum distance the technology can monitor a pipeline. The best 
technologies were FOC temperature, acoustic, and vacuum tube. 
The resilience of the technology during construction includes the probability of damage during 
installation. All extrinsic technologies are placed outside the pipe flow and so are usually 
situated in the harsh environment around the pipeline. They are either buried, placed on the sea 
floor near the pipeline, or placed along the pipeline. In such environments, there is a probability 
that equipment will be harn1ed during construction, laying, or burial. Because FOC-based 
temperature, strain, and acoustic technologies are placed along the outside of the pipeline, care 
must be taken so that they are attached at specific locations and the sensitive internal fibers are 
protected from damage. This internal sensitivity can lead to a chance of minor harm; thus, a rank 
of 6 is assigned. 
A pipe-in-pipe vacuum annulus is generally the most resilient technology, as the inner pipe is 
protected by an outside pipe. Equipment in the annulus is shielded from the outside environment, 
and thus almost immune to damage, so the pipe-in-pipe vacuum is given a rank of 1. 
A vacuum tube is a versatile and strong cable that is placed at a specific distance from the subsea 
pipeline. It can be bent severely and still function. It may be buried, placed on the sea floor near 
the pipeline, or placed along the pipeline. As the probability of harming the cable is low during 
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construction, a rank of 3 is chosen. Passive acoustic technology is placed at similar locations to a 
vacuum tube, so its rank is the same. 
Active acoustic technology (Sonardyne ALDS) is placed at a considerable distance on the sea 
floor to maintain a larger area to cover leaks. Since it is not a buried, or laid with the pipeline, it 
has less chance of being damaged due to placement. A rank of 2 was chosen to indicate a very 
low probability of being damaged. 
Pipelines and LDSs require specific equipment and personnel for installation, such as lay vessels, 
barges, and remotely operated vehicles. Some technologies require more specialized (and 
potentially more costly) equipment and services than others. Regarding equipment and personnel 
requirements, the only technology that requires considerably more effort and cost is the pipe-in-
pipe system, due to the larger diameter outer pipe, and excess weight. This leads to slower laying 
time, and a much greater cost than laying standard size pipe. Because of this, a rank of 9 is 
chosen. The other technologies have moderate difficulty with regard to laying pipe and are 
ranked as 5. 
The distance covered over the pipeline is judged according to the required 100 km monitored 
pipeline length set in the system scenario. If the technology can cover the entire pipeline, it 
fulfills the requirement. Using Table 21 and 1-9 ranking criteria, which correspond to 90, and 10 
km, a technology with coverage of less than 10 km will have a score of 9 and any technology 
covering more than 90 km will have a score of 1. Raman FOC (DTS) systems use multimode 
fibers but have limited distance ranges of around 10 km (without extenders), while Brillouin-
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based sensing technologies (DSS/DTS) have abilities beyond 50 km [50] in single systems. As 
long as the range extenders could be placed in subsea areas, there would be little difficulty in 
covering 100 km or even greater distances [49]. The coverage distance of 10-50 km without 
range extenders, with an average of 30 km, results in a rank of 7. 
Technology E (the vacuum tube) can be placed in sections up to - 2x25 km for each system [51] , 
but the performance decreases with length. Multiple systems can be used together over a length 
of pipe, though issues involving installation and placement of vacuum pumping stations can be a 
concern. A rank of 5 is assigned for the coverage distance of 50 km. 
Passive acoustic devices can be installed to over 100 km with spacing distances of 30-60m for 
each sensor [48] along the pipeline. A rank of 9 is assigned due to the need for multiple sensors 
over a 1-km range, and thus for a large number of individual sensors to cover the entire pipeline. 
Active acoustic sonar placed above the pipeline has distance coverage of 500 m, with many large 
pieces of equipment required to be stationed along the pipeline. This is currently very difficult 
using Sonardyne ALDS, as they must be battery-equipped or powered by another means. 
Information provided by Sonardyne indicates that this equipment is meant for platform or close-
to-shore use. A rank of 9 is assigned, as the distance covered is less than 1 km. Email exchanges 
with Sonardyne show that the active acoustic LDS is not yet ready for full pipeline use because 
of the cost and power requirements. 
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4.5.2.4. Regional Considerations 
External environment factors such as depth, temperature, water clarity, and buried condition 
were considered under this category to determine their effect on LDS. The best overall 
technologies were FOC-based strain and pipe-in-pipe vacuum annulus. 
As all technologies are to be deployed subsea, they should be able to perform at a pipeline's 
operational depth. Currently, all technologies perform well and are certified for use at 100 m and 
beyond (Section 3 .2) except for vacuum tubing, as it has only been tested to near 100 m. One 
challenge is that in deep water, when the hydrocarbon gas phase is inhibited (by dissolving 
directly into the surrounding high-pressure water), vacuum tubing is less able to detect migrating 
hydrocarbon molecules. It is not clear at what depth this begins, and without testing beyond ~ 100 
m, vacuum tubing will be rated 3, with a low probability of being effective beyond the 100-m 
depth. The detection mechanisms of all other technologies perform well at depths greater than 
100m. 
Temperature changes can affect instrumentation and sensor readings. All technologies perform 
well in the temperature range of the scenario except for FOC-based temperature technology. As 
its detection mechanism is based on temperature, it is affected by changing temperatures along a 
pipeline and fluctuations in the surroundings. Even so, there is little probability of detection 
being affected by the changes due to the external environment along a 1 00-km span, and so a 
rank of 3 is chosen. 
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Water clarity, organisms, dirt, and other factors can affect certain LDSs. In the current list, only 
active acoustic may be affected. Because active acoustic technologies send out acoustic signals at 
high frequency, they are reflected back when they encounter different mediums in water. It may 
be possible with enough environmental variables (organisms or growth on or around equipment) 
that the active acoustic would be affected. Because of this possibility, a rank of 5 is selected for 
this technology. All other technologies are relatively unaffected and are ranked 1. 
A buried condition describes a pipeline covered by soil in a trench or otherwise. It is assumed 
that the detection levels of FOC-based temperature and acoustic, and passive and active acoustic 
equipment are affected when covered by soil. Temperature in the area of the spill would be more 
constant, as the soil already acts as an insulator to trap heat around the pipeline from the 
surrounding ocean. FOC-based sensors may have slower and less drastic response to an under-
soil spill than an open water spill on the seabed. The heat released from the flow may reach a 
peak level , and then spread along the pipeline. Therefore, it is assumed that the detection will be 
affected, though to an unknown level, 5. 
FOC-based acoustic and passive acoustic sensors may also be affected because of the insulating 
properties of soil. Vibrations, other pressure, and sound waves would be dampened, which could 
lower the detection probability or slow the initial detection. Passive acoustic would have 
difficulty with sounds due to the different physical gradients present in soil, but these 
technologies have worked well on land for buried pipeline [15]. Passive acoustic technologies 
that listen to sounds produced in the steel pipe because of the leak are not affected (as these are 
attached to the pipe and listen for changes in vibration frequencies). Passive acoustic 
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technologies are ranked at 4 in terms of the probability of detection being affected. Active 
acoustic technology would be affected more than passive acoustic, as it needs to send high-
frequency waves that must return to the sensor, and if the pipeline is buried this is likely 
impossible; a rank of 9 applies. 
Vacuum tube leak detection would not be seriously affected by being buried, as the oil and gas 
molecules permeate the soil with time. It is unknown how long this would take, and so unknown 
harm is assumed, 5. 
4.5.2.5. Decommissioning 
Decommissioning (Figure 4.3) is the process to remove the LDS at the end of the life of the 
pipeline or the LDS. It will be rated in a cost of km of pipe laid per day (km/day). In general, 
hiring barges and crews for this work is standard, so all numbers will be rated at the same 
standard. Cost is based on a $/km standard for removing pipeline components. The average cost 
based on industry sources to remove a subsea pipeline is $750,000 per day at 4 km per day. For a 
1 00-km pipeline, that is approximately $18.75 million. 
The challenge for some technologies is the required time to decommission an LDS. 
Decommissioning a much larger pipe diameter, as used in pipe-in-pipe LDS, or many point 
sensors placed near a strand of pipe, may take longer than for a smaller, lighter pipeline and a 
light cable vacuum tube. Ranks that considered these factors were assigned to the technologies. 
FOC-based temperature, strain, acoustic, vacuum tube, and passive acoustic equipment is placed 
very near or attached to the pipeline during laying the pipeline, so the removal of this technology 
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should be easy; therefore, a rank of 2 is chosen. A pipe-in-pipe vacuum annulus would be 
difficult to remove from the seabed using standard equipment, and therefore it is rated 7. Active 
acoustic sensors pose moderate difficulty, as the only the sensors need to be removed, so a rank 
of 4 is chosen. 
4.6. Subjective Probability and Consequence Analysis 
When enough objective knowledge was unavailable for straightforward calculations, the ranking 
method described above was used. Sufficient information was gathered and parameters were 
ranked according to Table 4.2. When enough objective information was available direct 
calculations were used for analysis without the ranking method. 
In order to have results that correspond with the objective analysis later in this chapter, the same 
mathematical method was used for both subjective and objective sections. This parallel 
methodology places the subjective criteria on the same scale as the objective criteria (with the 
same methodology), and was used to determine the probability of exceeding the median for a 
given set of values. The median was taken as the base value, and all criteria were compared to it. 
Basically, exceeding a median for a given set of values indicates that an event is more likely to 
occur than the median event. If in Table 4.2 a technology scores a 9 but the median score is 
calculated as 5, the technology rated at 9 is much more likely to exceed the median performance 
parameter. A technology with a score of 2, though, would be much less likely to exceed the 
median performance parameter. The likelihood of exceeding the median is calculated using the 
following equation: 
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Lognormal Distribution Time Dependent Failure Model 
t == ex -- ln--1 [ 1 ( t )2] f ( ) ...n:rrsf p zs2 tmed (2) 
Where s is the shape parameter affecting the curve, and lmed is the median time to failure. The 
distribution is only valid for positive values oft and is therefore an appropriate choice for fai lure 
distribution analysis. Because the lognormal distribution is a monotonically increasing function, 
it can be manipulated to Equation 3. The probability of exceedance oft (a specific score) over 
lmed (the median score) can be determined using Equation 3, which acts as the PoF in risk 
calculation. What is measured on the standard normal distribution is the distance that t occurs 
from lmed· 
Logarithmic Equation on Normal Distribution 
F(t) == <p (~ ln-t-) 
S tmed 
(3) 
Where cp = probability of exceeding the median of a set of values, s = shape factor of the 
distribution, t = occurrence of an event (or technology rank/score in this case), and lmed = median 
time for specific criteria. 
With the above equation, is it possible to determine how likely it is for one technology (for a 
specific criterion) to exceed the median value fo r all technologies. In this way it is possible to 
judge the technologies based on their individual criteria, which are less than, equal to, or 
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exceeding the median threshold. For example, technologies that exceed a "bad" value median are 
of less worth than technologies below that threshold. 
Weighting is used for each category; for example, under the flow conditions (Figure 4.2), four 
criteria are evaluated, each with an equal importance. Each parameter is multiplied by \14 to 
normalize the risk calculations. In the same figure, regional considerations have five sub-
categories, with buried pipeline being the most important. 
4.6.1 . Risk Calculation from Ranking Methodology 
Based on the ranking criteria described in Table 4.2 and the rationale described in Section 4.5 , all 
technologies were ranked for the flow conditions and in this section the procedure is described. 
Table 4.3: Flow conditions 
Flow Conditions: Solid Content (0.25 Weightage) 
Parameter Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median ()) cp[x] Importance Probability Technology Risk 
A I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.25 0.05 $3,000,000 $157,868 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.25 0.05 $3,000,000 $157,868 
c 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.25 0.13 $3,000,000 $402,238 
D 1 5 -0.80 0.21 0.25 0.05 $4,500,000 $236,802 
E I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.25 0.05 $2,250,000 $ 118,401 
F 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.25 0.13 $3,300,000 $442,462 
G 2 5 -0.46 0.32 0.25 0.08 $4,370,000 $353,34 1 
The first step is to determine the probability of exceeding the median for a given technology. 
This involves finding maximum and minimum possible scores from the technologies. In the case 
of Table 4.3 , the maximum and minimum possible values are 9 and 1 respectively, and the 
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median is 5. The next step is to calculate the probability of exceeding the median. Two different 
distributions are used. These are explained below. 
Lognormal Distribution Time Dependent Failure Model 
t - ex -- ln--1 [ 1 ( t )2] f ( ) -~ p 2s2 tmed (4) 
where s above is the shape parameter affecting curve shape, and lmed, the location parameter, is 
the median time to failure. The distribution is only valid for positive values oft and is therefore 
an appropriate choice for failure distribution analysis. Because the lognormal distribution is a 
monotonically increasing function, it can be manipulated to the following form: 
Logarithmic Equation on Normal Distribution 
F(t) == <p (~ ln-t-) 
S tmed 
(5) 
Where <p = probability of exceeding the mean of a set of values, s = shape factor of the 
distribution, t = occurrence of an event, or time that an event takes place for each individual 
technology, and lmed = median of the technologies measured for the same criteria. 
The probability of exceedance oft over lmed can be determined using a Logarithmic Equation on 
Normal Distribution. It gives a distance between t and lmed on the standard normal distribution. 
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For the flow rate criteria for FOC-based temperature LOSs, at value of 1, a lmedvalue of 5, and a 
shape parameter value of 2 are used in calculations. The <p, ( -0.804 7), is found on the normal 
distribution to be F(t)=0.21 05. 
Weighting is used to combine different categories. For example, in Figure 4.2, the technological 
section weight represents 1/3 of the total risk hierarchy (with the other 2/3 being operational and 
spill factors). Therefore, the risk from technological factors is 1/3 of the total risk. Each category 
includes sub-criteria with which weights have been associated. For the flow conditions, four 
criteria were evaluated, each of equal importance. Each sub-criterion is then multiplied by 1/4 so 
that the total four criteria equate to 1. 
Using Table 4.3 , the value <p(x) = 0.2105 * 25% = 0.0526, which is the weighted probability 
of occurrence. As the cost of the technology is $3,000,000 the risk is (cost multiplied by 
weighted probability of occurrence): $3,000,000 * 0.0526 = $157,868. 
The risks for all ranked criteria are computed following the same procedure. To ensure 
uniformity, objective calculations follow a similar method that uses objective values to 
determine the median and probability of exceedance without the subjective 1-9 scale parameter 
scale. 
Please see Appendix 1 : Calculations for all computations. 
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4.7. Objective Assessment Methodology 
The objective criteria that have available quantitative information for calculations are in this 
section. There is no need to rank any values prior to calculation of risk. For example, information 
is gathered about each technology and the specific values researched will create the median for 
each case. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 are used below, as in Section 4.6. 
4.7.1.1. Technological Maturity 
Commercial availability is measured by the number of vendors who can supply a g1ven 
technology. More vendors providing a technology will generally mean more support and more 
availability of components for a given LDS. In some cases the LDS was divided into component 
levels to assess the availability . For example, a pipe-in-pipe vacuum LDS is a combination of 
vapor sensing tubes and hydrocarbon sniffers. Engineering firms are the actual designers of an 
entire pipeline with proper components to develop the LDS, so the availability of these 
individual components defines the availability of the technology. 
The probability of exceeding the median number of vendors Umed) is a positive attribute, as 
exceeding this would show a higher number of vendors available than the median. Thus, the 
technology would have a lower risk (from the viewpoint of vendor availability) than one with 
fewer vendors. Because exceeding the median is a positive attribute, to properly calculate the 
risk in Equation 5, we subtract the qJ(x) value from 1, which is the probability of occurrence. 
Subsequently multiplying this probability of exceedance by the cost of the technologies gives the 
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risk. The greater the number of vendors available, the smaller is the risk of availability . The 
assessment methodology is explained below with numerical examples: 
Table 4.4: Vendors for Technologies 
FOC FOC FOC Vacuum/Vapor Passive Active 
Temperature Strain Acoustic Sensing Tubes Acoustic Acoustic 
Number 5 5 3 8 10 2 
of 
Vendors 
Technology information in this section is taken from [4].Technology A, FOC DTS, is available 
from five vendors: Omnisens SA, Sensa Industrial (Schlumberger), Oz Optics, Sensortran, and 
Smartec. Technology B, FOC DSS, can be considered to be the same as A from a vendor 
standpoint, because both use the Rayleigh optical time domain incident light as the detection 
method. Since most components are the same for both LDSs, FOC DSS is also avai lable from 
five vendors. 
Technology C, FOC Acoustic, is available from three vendors: Sabeus Inc., Sensomet, and 
Optasense (Qinetiq) [52], [53]. 
Technologies D and E, pipe-in-pipe and vacuum tube sensing, are available from six vendors: 
Areva LEOS, Phoenix (formerly NESCO), Praxair, Neptune Oceanographics, Capsum, Phaze 
Technologies, Contros, and Franatech. Note that pipe-in-pipe technology is not supplied as a 
complete LDS; rather, components are available from vendors and the complete system will be 
engineered for use in specific circumstances. 
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Technology F, Passive Acoustic LDS, is available from eight vendors: Physical Acoustic 
Corporation, Neptune Oceanographics, Naxys, Sicom (now Weatherford), Co. L. Mar, Clampon, 
Rocket Science Acoustics, and Avetaq. 
Technology G, Active Acoustic, is supplied by two vendors: Sonardyne, and Co. L. Mar. 
4.7.1.2. Technological Maturity Level Calculation 
Computing the technological maturity level requires the first application date of each technology 
for leak detection (even if not for the specific subsea scenario here). The first application dates of 
different technologies are given in Table 24. 
The first patent using fiber optic cable with an acoustic measurement along a pipeline occurred 
in 2005 [54]. Vacuum insulated tubing began to be sold in the US in the 1980s. 
Table 4.5: Maturity by Age 
FOC FOC FOC V acuumN apor Passive Active 
Temp Strain Acoustic Sensing Tubes Acoustic* Acoustic 
Year of 1999 N/A 2005 - 1982 - 1994 2005 
First [54, 55] (Unknown, 
Application so median 
will be 
used) 
Vacuum pipe-in-pipe systems have been used in the Arctic, and should work well for detection 
of single phase leaks [56]. 
102 
Risk-based Selection of Subsea Leak Detection Technologies Hillier, A. 
Passive acoustic systems have been used in different forms along pipelines [10]. Certain 
technologies use vibrations in pipes [9] , and others use sounds generated from leaks travelling 
through the water to detect leaks in pipe. 
Active acoustic types have, for the most part, been used on subsea production installations ([ 4], 
[57]) and are better for monitoring multiphase and gas phase pipelines [2]. Col. L. Mar was one 
of the first vendors to provide subsea monitoring using acoustic technologies, in 1998. The most 
mature technologies are vacuum sensing tubes and passive acoustic. 
Using the mathematical methodology described, the probability of occurrence is determined 
from median exceedance on the normal distribution; the probability of exceedance for maturity 
signifies where a particular technology stands with regard to median age of all leak detection 
technologies and the consequence is the cost of the technology. 
4.7.1.3. MTBF 
Using the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) branch of Figure 4.3 , the detailed calculations 
are presented for this operational factor of maintenance. The minimum and maximum times 
between failures for all technologies are 5 and 30 years [8] . The t median for Equation 5 used for 
calculation is then (5+30)/2=17.5 years. 
Choosing Technology A, FOC-based LDS, and knowing that the MTBF is 25 years, while the 
median is 17.5, and using the shape parameter in Equation 5 as 2, the values are computed and 
cp(O.l783) is found to be F(t)=0.5708 based on the normal distribution (afterwards the 
weighting is multiplied as well). This gives the failure probability/probability of exceedance in 
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the risk equation. Knowing the failure and the consequence (i.e., the cost of the technology for 
the scenario), the risk can be determined as above. 
Because there are three main risk branches, and multiple sub-branched nodes, each individual 
criterion caries a subjective weight value. For example, there are four criteria in the section on 
Maintenance in the Factors Affecting Operations, and the risk is computed as: 114 (weight) * 
0.5708 (PoE) * 3000000 (Consequence) = $428078.30. The 114 is due to the fact that there are 
four individual criteria of equal importance. Further analysis is provided below ( 4.8). 
4.8. Risk Calculations for Objective Criteria 
This section presents some examples of the performance of objective risk analysis. 
4.8.1. Risk Analysis Examples 
4.8.1.1. Spill Scenario 
The last of the main divisions ofthe technology evaluation (technological and operational factors 
being the first and second, respectively) is the environmental spill factor. The PoF is based on the 
probability of a leak occurring, multiplied by the probability of its not being detected. The 
consequence is the cost to clean up the leaked oil. The oil that is leaked is the base detection 
threshold for each technology (converted into a percentage of flow). 
First, the pipeline is assumed to move 50 000 bbl/day or 7 945 000 Llday. The leak rate in 
Canada for 2009 was four leaks per 1000 km of pipeline [15]. Using A. as the rate of occurrence, 
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with calculation of the hazard rate being 4 per 1000 km, the probability of occurrence 1s 
calculated by the following. 
R == eC-A*llUmberofkmofpipe) (6) 
Therefore, R=e/\(-411000 km*100 km)= 0.6703 . There is a 67.03% chance of a leak occurring 
over a period of one year for a 100 km pipeline. 
Note: Calculations of % of detectable flow are based on the technology threshold detection 
rates. 
Leak Risk for Each Technology 
Risk(of specific technology) = Pleak * (1- Pdetection) *Technology Cost (7) 
Where Pdetection is the probability of the mean flow being detected by the technology. 
In general, FOC technologies can detect in the range of 50 ml/min of fluid [9].50 ml/min*60 
min/hour*24 hours/day = 72 Llday detection rate. For a detection rate of 72 Llday I 7 945 000 
Llday = 0.00000906 or 0.000906 % of flow. 
Passive acoustic (3] technologies can detect in the range of 5 Llmin of fluid, or 7200 Llday rate 
[52].For a detection rate of7200 Llday I 7 945 000 Llday = 0.000906 or 0.0906% of flow. 
Pipe-in-pipe vacuum technologies (56] can detect in the range of 1 Llmin or 1440 Llday rate 
[53]. For a detection rate of 1440Liday I 7 945 OOOL/day = 0.00018 1 or 0.0181 % of flow. 
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A floating type active sonar acoustic[2] has the ability to detect - 100-500 bbllday depending on 
the subsea distance and conditions, and the phase of leaked oil. For analysis purposes, the mean 
is selected. The detection rate would then be 300 bbl/day, for a detection rate of 300Liday / 7 945 
000 Llday = 0.0000387 or 0.00387% of flow. Calculation details are given below; note that total 
risk values for each hierarchy are then multiplied by 1/3 (as there are 3 total branches). 
Table 4.6: Oil spill calculations 
Detect cp[x] Probability 
able ofnot being Cost of 
Technologies % oftlow detected POD= l-cp[x] Technology Risk 
FOC 0.001 0.440 0.560 $3,000,000 $1,319,617 
Pipe-in-pipe 0.018 0.911 0.089 $4,500,000 $4,099,235 
Vacuum Tube 0.018 0.911 0.089 $2,250,000 $2,049,618 
Passive Accoustic 0.091 0.984 0.016 $3,300,000 $3,248,102 
Active Acoustic 0.004 0.713 0.287 $4,370,000 $3,115,952 
4.8.2. Cleanup Cost Due to Spill 
The cleanup cost due to a spill was calculated knowing the detection threshold for each 
technology from Section 4.8.3. Knowing the number of liters that is spilled before the 
technology is able to detect the leak is the absolute minimum amount spilled that needs to be 
accounted for. 
The threshold per day for FOC is 60s, and so per day 60/86400=0.0007/day. Knowing that 
50,000bbllday is travelling through the pipeline, that 159 L are in 1 barrel, and the pipeline is 
known to be moving 184 Lis through the line, the costs to cleanup can be determined. 
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Table 4.7: Cleanup due to spill 
Environment: Minimum Cleanup due to Spill (0.50 weight) 
Time in seconds to Cost per Total 
Technologies Pipeline bbVsec detect Amount bbls barrel Damage 
FOC 0.58 300 173.6 $4,200 $120,313 
PIP/Vacuum 0.58 7200 4166.7 $4,200 $2,887,500 
Passive Acoustic 0.58 300 173.6 $4,200 $120,313 
Active Acoustic 0.58 300 173.6 $4,200 $120,313 
4.8.3. Probability of Failure for Technologies 
This section deals with calculating the reliability of the main components of each technology. 
For simplicity's sake it will include only the chain of components that begins with the process of 
leak detection and ends with the analysis and control system (this also includes the telemetry 
system). 
Technologies will be compared to each other based on overall time to failure of the system, the 
worst component in the system chain, the repair times for components, etc. The fault rate of the 
system is determined by the reliability of each component. Because this system is modeled as a 
series system, the overall reliability of the system is given by the multiplication of all elements. 
In order to determine specific reliability rates, assumptions for components will be necessary. 
The average failure rate is represented by J....., with units of failure per time. The probability that a 
component will not fail during the time interval (O,t) is given by the following Poisson 
distribution in Equation 8. 
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Failure Formula 
(8) 
where R is the reliability and constant failure rate is A. As time goes to infinity, the reliability 
goes to 0. For the risk analysis, this report will focus on the PoF, which is defined as 1-R(t) . 
The mean time to failure (MTTF) is computed with the assumption that the failure rates are 
constant, and so 1/A. is equal to the MTTF. 
The PoF of the system is calculated usmg values from Chemical Safety Process [33], the 
Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) handbook [58], and Lee's Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries [59]. In many cases, assumptions for components were made and, to simplify analysis, 
series connections were assumed. 
To illustrate an example of a MTTF calculation, a pipe-in-pipe vacuum pump LDS was selected 
and described below. In order to calculate specific reliability rates, assumptions at the 
components level will be necessary. The formula for reliability used is the failure formula in 
Equation 8. The hazard rate is the failure per unit of time for specific components. For a pipe-in-
pipe vacuum LDS, the following assumptions will be used for calculations and simplification: 
• The telemetry has a fault/hazard rate of0.2/year or a 0.2 fault rate [33]. 
• The hydrocarbon sniffer will be modeled as process sensors (control and safety 
equipment) with 2.81/10"'6 hour fai lure rate, or a 0.02463 fault rate [59]. 
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• The vacuum pump operation is modeled as a standard pump [58] with 20.52/1 Q/'6 
hour failure rate or a 0.18 fault rate. 
• The console light is modeled as an indicator lamp with a 0.044 fault rate [33]. 
r;·):_1p-t1-ow_· -d-iJ-·e-ct-io_n ___ ...... ~;.;.;...~,;.;c:>..;;,.;;.;;,.;.,;....;.;.;;...;_ _ ) c:> 
_ Pipeline product flow _ 
Pump 
c:> Sensor 
Externa l pipe covering flow line 
Figure 4.5: Pipe-in-pipe vacuum pump 
In a pipe-in-pipe vacuum system, the vacuum is started at regular intervals, and the gas that has 
been pumped out is analyzed. If hydrocarbons are detected, then the approximate distance to the 
leak can be determined by the area that is between the two pipes, along with the time that the 
pumped volume is leaving the area. The hydrocarbon reading can be used to estimate the leak 
SIZe. 
Table 4.8: Pipe-in-pipe vacuum process flow 
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The fault rate ofthe system is determined by the PoF of each component, where 
Probability of failure (PoF) 1- R(t) (9) 
Because this system is modeled as a series system, the overall reliability of the system is given 
by the multiplication of each element, which is lower than component reliability. 
Using Equation 8 with the above fault rates, R(t)=0.6385, and the PoF is 1-R(t)=0.36/year. If the 
consequences are then $4,500,000, the risk is $2,250,000. The parameter weight in this case is 
0.5. 
Risks for other technologies are calculated in the same manner, and are shown in Appendix 1. 
4.8.4. Parameter Weighting 
A number of calculations were performed on multiple parameters, and specific weights were 
assigned, as all parameters are not equally significant. For this, industry and expert analysis was 
used to assign weights. In all cases, parameter weights are calculated subjectively based on 
industry requirements. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 have multiple branches from higher-level 
nodes. The branches of risk are calculated from each single node (such as factors affecting 
operations, technology, and the environment), which splits into subgroups, (in this case, 
operational reliability, maintenance, decommissioning, etc), which, when summed, total 1. In the 
case of operational factors , PoF, maintenance, and decommissioning have weight parameters that 
affect the total risk calculated. For example, PoF risk * 1/2 + maintenance risk* 114 + 
decommissioning risk* 114. This is the same for each subcategory in all the hierarchies. 
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Flow condition parameters do not heavily affect any technology individually, and are all 
considered to have approximately the same importance, so 1/4 weight for each parameter (as 
there are four parameters under this node) was considered fair. 
For implementation, the most important parameters are construction and range of technology 
over distance covered. As the equipment and personnel are relatively the same for most 
technologies, the most important factors are the range that the technology covers, and the 
resilience during construction. 
Some categories are more important that others from a risk point of view, which is why different 
weights are assigned. The most important regional consideration parameter is for a buried pipe; 
this is highly desirable as it is the norm when laying subsea pipelines. It will be given a weight of 
0. 70, while other parameters in this category will be given 0.1 0. 
See Appendix 1 for further details. 
4.8.5 . Special Cases 
In certain cases, the parameter being measured can be positive or a negative. In the case of a 
negative value, exceeding the median will result in a higher risk (due to a higher probability of 
exceeding a negative median value), and for a positive parameter, exceeding the median wi ll 
result in a lower risk. Because exceeding the median at any time in the logarithmic equation 
gives a higher PoF, when test parameters produce positive attributes of exceeding the median, 
the value must be subtracted from one to correct the probability. 
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For example, in the tables below, availability greater than the median should reduce the risk. One 
must know if the criterion is a positive attribute or a detrimental attribute. For positive attributes, 
1 is subtracted from <J>[ x] to obtain the correct result. 
Table 4.9: Commercial Availability (not subtracting one from cp[x]) 
Technological Maturity: Commercial Availability (not subtracting 1 from cp[x]) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <ll cp[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 5 6 -0.0912 0.4637 0.0191 $3,000,000 $57,381 
B 5 6 -0.0912 0.4637 0.0191 $3,000,000 $57,381 
c 3 6 -0.3466 0.3645 0.0150 $3,000,000 $45,101 
D 6 6 0.0000 0.5000 0.0206 $4,500,000 $92,813 
E 6 6 0.0000 0.5000 0.0206 $2,250,000 $46,406 
F 8 6 0. 1438 0.5572 0.0183 $3,300,000 $60,278 
G 2 6 -0.5493 0.2914 0.0120 $4,370,000 $52,528 
Table 4.10: Vendors for Technologies (subtracting 1 from cp[x]) 
Technological Maturity: Commercial Availability 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <ll cp[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 5 6 -0.091 2 0.4637 0.022 1 $3,000,000 $66,369 
B 5 6 -0.0912 0.4637 0.0221 $3,000,000 $66,369 
c 3 6 -0.3466 0.3645 0.0262 $3,000,000 $78,649 
D 6 6 0.0000 0.5000 0.0206 $4,500,000 $92,81 3 
E 6 6 0.0000 0.5000 0.0206 $2,250,000 $46,406 
F 8 6 0.1438 0.5572 0.0183 $3,300,000 $60,278 
G 2 6 -0.5493 0.2914 0.0120 $4,370,000 $52,528 
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4.9. Rank of Technologies 
The risk of each technology was computed using the equations and methodology described in the 
earlier sections, with the risk ranked as follows. All detailed computations are reported in 
Appendix 1. 
Table 4.11: Total risk 
Final Total 
Techno log) Risk 
A $ 930,615 
B $ 855,520 
c $ 964,068 
D $ 4,476,631 
E $ 3,670,692 
F $ 1,441,068 
G $ 1,613,757 
4.1 0. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how risk analysis can be performed with objective data, using the 
probability of exceedance of median values for a given criteria. In the case of subsea leak 
detection analysis, specific criteria were selected and medians were assessed for each 
technology. The distance of each technology from the mean for each criterion was calculated. 
This has an advantage over traditional risk-based analysis methods for applications involving 
multi-criteria decision making, as different problem criteria are analyzed using the same 
approach, with the conclusion being the same monetary unit. 
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The practicality in the method is shown in large problems with varied criteria. In these 
problems, categories can be broken into sub-sections and then each criterion analyzed in 
comparison to others, while the same methodology is applied to the rest of the criteria. At times, 
varied scenarios can involve different criteria (spill scenario, MTBF, pipeline flow information) 
that are difficult to equate without different mathematical methods. The methodology presented 
solves this problem, by comparing each criterion to others before multiplying the consequences 
and having the same single monetary unit. 
A challenge arises though, in the collection of authentic and applicable objective information on 
which to base probability of exceedance values. In the present work, the solution to this lack of 
information is the ranking method described in Section 4.5 using the probability of exceedance. 
The conclusion of the risk result is comparable to the BAT approach used by industry in Chapter 
3, but here, the use of objective and historical information with a much broader problem scope 
allows for the consideration of technological, environmental, and maintenance issues. 
4.1 0.1. Limitations of Evaluation and Future Work 
The values determined for the risk assessment may not be entirely accurate, since they rely on 
certain assumptions. The following limitations should be noted: 
• This study is based on available literature and historical data, and certain 
assumptions may introduce elements of subjectivity into the analysis. 
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• Some numbers may not be accurate because of the lack of an actual cost analysis. 
A problem with quantifying the risk is the subjectivity involved in determining 
values. 
• Certain scenarios would limit the use of particular technologies, so all are not 
equally suitable for all cases. 
• For certain technologies (passive acoustic and/or other point sensors), individual 
failure along a strand did not affect any calculations for detection. This means that 
even though there is a failure rate associated with each individual point sensor, it 
was not considered in the evaluation of risk calculation. Continuous measuring 
technologies would not present this problem. 
• When the strand is broken at any point, continuous measuring technologies will 
affect the detection along the area after or before the cut. This was not taken into 
account in the evaluation. 
• Because limited information exists about pipe-in-pipe vacuum annulus 
technology, it was assumed to function m the same way as vacuum tube 
technology, m terms of detecting leaks. Where appropriate (as with 
construction/decommissioning costs), different values were used to differentiate 
the two. 
• A simplified diagram and assumptions are used to find the modes of failure for 
the system. 
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5.1. Summary 
This thesis has explored the concept of risk-based analysis usmg subjective and objective 
information in decision-making. The main focus of the study was to show how risk analysis can 
be performed using objective data as the probability of deviation from normal behavior in a 
given situation. In the case of subsea leak detection analysis, specific criteria were selected and 
medians were assessed for each technology using available objective information. Two case 
studies were analyzed, one on subsea leak detection (SLD) technologies using objective risk, and 
another using Best Available Technology (BAT) based on subjective risk. 
In Chapter 4, the unique method of determining risk was developed and applied to the case study 
of SLD technologies. The methodology involved the use of historical and objective information 
to provide a median risk to rate the technologies studied. Each technology was then analyzed for 
being below or above this median risk threshold. Those below the median risk threshold were the 
desirable technologies, and those above were undesirable choices for a given criterion. Positive 
criteria analysis, or BAT, has been used successfully for many applications. In Chapter 3, it was 
used to determine the best technologies. This allowed for comparing and contrasting the two 
methods used. 
The methodology presented in this thesis is unique; it compares different technologies through 
the concept of deviation from the median values. It provides a way to look for solutions using 
attributes and specific criteria applied to all technologies. This methodology simplifies long and 
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complex risk analyses often used in decision-making. It provides a unique and important tool for 
engineering analysis using a holistic approach. It adds meaning and understanding of risk, and it 
brings together different information and criteria to a unified value. It provides a helpful 
mechanism to achieve a single monetary value from historical and objective data for engineering 
analysis. 
Table 5.1: Comparison between methods 
Final Total: Risk-based Methodology Final Total: We ighted Average Method 
Technology Rank Risk Technology Rank 
A 2 $ 932,849 A 2 
B 1 $ 866,522 B 3 
c 3 $ 953,158 c 1 
D 7 $ 4,625,614 D 6 
E 6 $ 3,745,183 E 6 
F 4 $ 1,567,326 F 4 
G 5 $ 1,675,673 G 5 
5.2. Conclusions 
Comparing the risk-based method to the BAT weighted average method resulted in the fo llowing 
conclusions: 
• The best technologies to monitor a pipeline for arctic subsea application based on 
the weighted average criteria developed were FOC-based DIS, DSS, DVS/DAS 
systems and the passive acoustic sensors. The risk-based analysis determined that 
the best technologies were FOC-distributed sensors, and active and passive 
acoustic. 
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• Both methods produce similar results. 
• Similar parameters and features in the weighted average method also appear in the 
risk calculations, e.g., the lowest detectable leak and distance covered for each 
technology. 
• These conclusions confirm the relevance of the risk-based decision-making 
methodology presented. 
• The cost of the pipe-in-pipe and VSS tube method are very high. The calculations 
reveal that this is because of the time required to check the sensors. As the 
threshold for detection is higher than other methods, and because of the time 
required during the vacuum pump operation, the environmental section increases 
the cost far beyond that of other methods of detection. 
Pipe-in-pipe and VSS technologies were removed from risk calculations because of their high 
cost, and the fo llowing conclusions were drawn: 
• From the subjective ranking parameters and historical calculations, the fi rst-, 
second-, and third-placed technologies with the least risk were the vacuum tube, 
FOC DSS, and FOC DTS. 
• The technologies most widely available from vendors were passive acoustic, and 
then vacuum/vapor sensing tubes. 
• The most mature technology was vacuum/vapor sensing tubes; the next was 
passive acoustic technology. 
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• Currently, active acoustic point systems technologies are used to monitor 
pipelines only in high-risk locations, not over the entire pipeline, because of their 
cost 
5.3. Limitations 
The study has the following limitations: 
• This study is based on available literature and historical data, with assumptions 
outlined in the Scenario section 3.2. 
• Because of the lack of actual cost analysis, numbers may not be precise. 
• There might be uncertainty in quantifying the risk, as a result of lack of available 
data for some parameters. 
• This study may not apply to all scenarios, as certain scenarios would limit the use 
of particular technologies. 
• The conclusions in the thesis are for specified conditions and cannot be 
generalized, as individual conditions of the technology, operations, and 
environment may affect risk. 
5.4. Recommendations 
In addition to the limitations mentioned above, this work could be further improved by the 
adoption of the following recommendations: 
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• Numerical evaluation usmg CFD software to gather information on LDS 
performance (software such as Ansys FLUENT, CFX, or CFD-Flow may be used 
for this purpose) 
• Large-scale field tests to obtain the operational performance data (this includes 
the data for minimum leak detection thresholds and minimum time to detect 
small, chronic leaks) 
• Validation of numerical results with field test results 
• Assessment of the performance of selected LDS technologies with respect to 
inspection, maintenance, and retrofit requirements 
• Sending industry specific surveys to determine the most important requirements 
for LDS 
• Use of more comprehensive calculations specific to each technology to help 
improve the accuracy of the risk assessment in the case of failure analysis 
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Appendix 1: Calculations 
Key 
FOC-Temperature A 
FOC-Strain 8 
FOC-Acoustic c 
Pipe-in-Pipe Vacuum D 
Vacuum Tube E 
Passive Acoustic F 
Active Acoustic G 
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Subjective Calculation Component 
Technology A B C D E F G 
G 
4 
2 
C D E F 
6 8 5 6 6 
5 9 5 5 9 
5 6 4 9 
Re~ · 1!;W¢lati6~ ;* 1&' 4!6' A B c D E F G 
Depth I I I I 3 I I 
Temperature 3 I I I I I 1 
Water Clarity I 1 I 1 I 1 5 
Buried Condition 5 I 4 I 5 4 9 
Objective Calculation Component 
A B C D E F G 
Commercial Availability 5 5 3 6 6 8 2 
Technolo Readiness Level 13 13 5 30 30 18 5 
MTBF 25 25 25 5 5 25 5 
20 20 20 10 22 25 25 
2 2 2 7 2 5 3 
MTTF 5 5 5 7 2 5 3 
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Pipeline Conditions: Flow Rate (0.25 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median tl> cj>[ X) Probability Technology Risk 
A I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $3,000,000 $13,024 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $3,000,000 $13,024 
c 4 5 -0.11 0.46 0.0094 $3,000,000 $28,189 
D I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $4,500,000 $19,536 
E I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $2,250,000 $9,768 
F 4 5 -0.11 0.46 0.0094 $3,300,000 $3 1,008 
G 4 5 -0.11 0.46 0.0094 $4,370,000 $41,062 
Pipeline Conditions: Solid Content (0.25 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median tl> cj>[ X) Probability Technology Risk 
A I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.00 $3,000,000 $13,024 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.00 $3,000,000 $13,024 
c 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.01 $3,000,000 $33,185 
D I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.00 $4,500,000 $19,536 
E I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.00 $2,250,000 $9,768 
F 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.01 $3,300,000 $36,503 
G 2 5 -0.46 0.32 0.01 $4,370,000 $29,151 
Pipeline Conditions: Pressure Ranges (0.25 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median tl> cj>[ X) Probability Technology Risk 
A I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $3,000,000 $13,024 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $3,000,000 $13,024 
c 7 5 0.17 0.57 0.0117 $3,000,000 $35,071 
D I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $4,500,000 $19,536 
E I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $2,250,000 $9,768 
F 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0111 $3,300,000 $36,503 
G 1 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $4,370,000 $18,972 
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Pipeline Conditions: Temperature (0.25 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <ll cj>[ X 1 Probability Technology Risk 
A 3 5 -0.26 0.40 0.0082 $3,000,000 $24,70 1 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $3,000,000 $13,024 
c I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $3,000,000 $13,024 
D I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0043 $4,500,000 $19,536 
E 1 5 -0.80 0.24 0.0050 $2,250,000 $11 ,228 
F I 5 -0.80 0.91 0.0188 $3,300,000 $62,038 
G I 5 -0.80 0.05 0.00 11 $4,370,000 $4,939 
Implementation: Res ilience During Construction (0.50 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <ll cj>[ X 1 Probability Technology Risk 
A 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0221 $3,000,000 $66,369 
B 7 5 0.17 0.57 0.0234 $3,000,000 $70,142 
c 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0221 $3,000,000 $66,369 
D 8 5 0.24 0.59 0.0245 $4,500,000 $1 10,056 
E 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0206 $2,250,000 $46,406 
F 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0221 $3,300,000 $73,006 
G 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0221 $4,370,000 $96,678 
Implementation: Equipme nt and Personnel (0.10 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <ll cj>[ X 1 Probability Technology Risk 
A 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0041 $3,000,000 $12,375 
B 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0041 $3,000,000 $12,375 
c 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.004 1 $3,000,000 $12,375 
D 9 5 0.29 0.62 0.0051 $4,500,000 $22,853 
E 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0041 $2,250,000 $9,28 1 
F 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0041 $3,300,000 $13,613 
G 9 5 0.29 0.62 0.0051 $4,370,000 $22,193 
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Implementation: Range Over Pipeline Covered (0.25 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median ci> <P[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0177 $3,000,000 $53,095 
B 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0165 $3,000,000 $49,500 
c 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0165 $3,000,000 $49,500 
0 6 5 0.09 0.54 0.0177 $4,500,000 $79,643 
E 7 5 0.17 0.57 0.0187 $2,250,000 $42,085 
F 4 5 -0. 11 0.46 0.0150 $3,300,000 $49,613 
G 9 5 0.29 0.62 0.0203 $4,370,000 $88,773 
Regional Considerations: Depth (0.10 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median ci> <P[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.001 7 $3,000,000 $5,210 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,000,000 $5,210 
c I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,000,000 $5,210 
0 I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $4,500,000 $7,814 
E 3 5 -0.26 0.40 0.0033 $2,250,000 $7,410 
F I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,300,000 $5,73 1 
G I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $4,370,000 $7,589 
Regional Considerations: Water Temperature (0.10 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median ci> <P[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 3 5 -0.26 0.40 0.0033 $3,000,000 $9,880 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,000,000 $5,210 
c I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,000,000 $5,2 10 
0 I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.001 7 $4,500,000 $7,81 4 
E I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.001 7 $2,250,000 $3,907 
F I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,300,000 $5,73 1 
G I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $4,370,000 $7,589 
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Regional Considerations: Water Clarity (0.10 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <!) cj)[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.00 17 $3,000,000 $5,2 10 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,000,000 $5,210 
c I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,000,000 $5,210 
D I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $4,500,000 $7,814 
E I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $2,250,000 $3,907 
F I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $3,300,000 $5,731 
G I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0017 $4,370,000 $7,589 
Regional Considerations: Buried Condition (0.70 Weightage) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <!) cj)[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0289 $3,000,000 $86,625 
B I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0122 $3,000,000 $36,468 
c 4 5 -0. I I 0.46 0.0263 $3,000,000 $78,929 
D I 5 -0.80 0.21 0.0122 $4,500,000 $54,701 
E 5 5 0.00 0.50 0.0289 $2,250,000 $64,969 
F 4 5 -0.11 0.46 0.0263 $3,300,000 $86,822 
G 9 5 0.29 0.62 0.0355 $4,370,000 $155,352 
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Maintenance: MTBF (0.50 we ight) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <I> cp[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 13 18 -0.1486 0.4409 0.0182 $3,000,000 $54,564 
B 13 18 -0.1486 0.4409 0.0182 $3,000,000 $54,564 
c 5 18 -0.6264 0.2655 0.0110 $3,000,000 $32,860 
D 30 18 0.2695 0.6062 0.0250 $4,500,000 $112,531 
E 30 18 0.2695 0.6062 0.0250 $2,250,000 $56,265 
F 18 18 0.0141 0.5056 0.0209 $3,300,000 $68,827 
G 5 18 -0.6264 0.2655 0.0110 $4,370,000 $47,866 
Technological Maturity: Commercial Availability 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <I> cp[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 5 6 -0.0912 0.4637 0.0221 $3,000,000 $66,369 
B 5 6 -0.091 2 0.4637 0.0221 $3,000,000 $66,369 
c 3 6 -0.3466 0.3645 0.0262 $3,000,000 $78,649 
D 6 6 0.0000 0.5000 0.0206 $4,500,000 $92,813 
E 6 6 0.0000 0.5000 0.0206 $2,250,000 $46,406 
F 8 6 0.1438 0.5572 0.0183 $3,300,000 $60,278 
G 2 6 -0.5493 0.2914 0.0292 $4,370,000 $127,734 
Technological Maturity: Level ofMaturity 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <I> cp[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 14 20 -0. 1657 0.4342 0.0233 $3,000,000 $70,01 7 
B 20 20 0.0 127 0.5051 0.0204 $3,000,000 $61,250 
c 8 20 -0.4455 0.3280 0.0277 $3,000,000 $83,162 
D 3 1 20 0.2318 0.5916 0.0168 $4,500,000 $75,800 
E 3 1 20 0.2318 0.5916 0.0168 $2,250,000 $37,900 
F 19 20 -0.0130 0.4948 0.0208 $3,300,000 $68,768 
G 8 20 -0.4455 0.3280 0.0277 $4,370,000 $121,139 
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Decommissioning (0.25 weight) 
Weighted Cost of 
Technology Ranking T Median <!) cp[x] Probability Technology Risk 
A 2 5 -0.4055 0.3426 0.0283 $3,000,000 $84,786 
B 2 5 -0.4055 0.3426 0.0283 $3,000,000 $84,786 
c 2 5 -0.4055 0.3426 0.0283 $3,000,000 $84,786 
D 7 5 0.2209 0.5874 0.0485 $4,500,000 $218,080 
E 2 5 -0.4055 0.3426 0.0283 $2,250,000 $63,589 
F 5 5 0.0527 0.5210 0.0430 $3,300,000 $141 ,844 
G 3 5 -0.2027 0.4197 0.0346 $4,370,000 $151 ,302 
Environment: Clean up due to Spill (0.50 weight) 
Total 
Time in Seconds Amount Cost per Damage 
Technologies Pipeline bbl/sec to Detect bbls Barrel Cost 
FOC 0.58 300 174 $4,200 $120,313 
FOC 0.58 300 174 $4,200 $120,313 
FOC 0.58 300 174 $4,200 $120,313 
PIP/Vacuum 0.58 7200 4167 $4,200 $2,887,500 
PIP/Vacuum 0.58 7200 4 167 $4,200 $2,887,500 
Passive Acoustic 0.58 300 174 $4,200 $120,313 
Active Acoustic 0.58 300 174 $4,200 $120,313 
Environment: Detectable Percent ofFiow (0.50 weight) 
Detect cp[x] Probability 
able ofnot being POD=l- Cost of 
Technologies % ofOow detected cp[x] Technology Risk 
FOC 0.001 0.440 0.560 $3,000,000 $217,737 
Pipe in pipe 0.018 0.911 0.089 $4,500,000 $676,374 
Vacuum Tube 0.018 0.911 0.089 $2,250,000 $338,187 
Passive Acoustic 0.091 0.984 0.016 $3,300,000 $535,937 
Active Acoustic 0.004 0.713 0.287 $4,370,000 $514,132 
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Final Total: Risk-based Methodology 
Technology Rank Risk 
A 2 $ 930,615 
B 1 $ 855,520 
c 3 $ 964,068 
D 7 $ 4,476,631 
E 6 $ 3,670,692 
F 4 $ 1,441,068 
G 5 $ 1,613,757 
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